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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, we conduct experiments with human decision makers on supply chain 
contracting. We consider a manufacturer-retailer supply chain where the manufacturer 
sets contract parameters and the retailer faces the newsvendor problem. Contrary to 
theoretical predictions, we find the experimental performance of the wholesale price 
contract and the buyback contract to be close to each other. The buyback contract fails 
to fulfill its promise of inducing high order quantities leading to higher supply chain 
profits. The manufacturers offer more profitable buyback contracts to retailers, and as a 
result, the retailers make higher profit and the manufacturers make lower profit than 
predicted. On the contrary, the simple wholesale price contract resulted in higher 
retailer and total supply chain profits than predicted, thanks to the overstocking bias of 
the retailers. Another surprising observation is that experiments with short-run 
interaction between the manufacturer-retailer pairs resulted in higher profit than the 
experiments with long-run interaction. Finally, we did not find consistent evidence to 
support the existence of learning-by-doing, and of certain decision heuristics mentioned 
in literature.   
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TEDARĐK ZĐNCĐRĐ SÖZLEŞMELERĐNDE DENEYLER:                
SÖZLEŞME TĐPLERĐ VE ĐLĐŞKĐ UZUNLUĞUNUN ETKĐLERĐ 
 
Nükte Şahin 
Endüstri Mühendisliği, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2011 
Tez Danışmanı: Yard. Doç. Dr. Murat Kaya 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: tedarik zinciri yönetimi, sözleşme, satılmayan malların geri alımı 
üzerinden sözleşme, toptan satış fiyatı üzerinden sözleşme, davranışsal operasyon, 
deney, kararlarda yanlılık 
 
Özet 
 
Bu tezde, tedarik zincirlerinde sözleşmeler konusunda gerçek insanlarla karar verme 
deneyleri gerçekleştirdik. Üreticinin sözleşmeyi önerdiği, perakendecinin de “gazeteci 
çocuk” problemi ile karşı karşıya kaldığı bir üretici-perakendeci tedarik zincirini ele 
aldık. Kuramsal tahminlerin aksine, “satılmayan malların geri alımı üzerinden 
sözleşme” ile “toptan satış fiyatı üzerinden sözleşme” `nin deneysel performanslarının 
farklı olmadığını bulduk. Geri alım sözleşmesinin, perakendecinin stok miktarını 
arttırarak toplam karı yükseltme beklentisini karşılayamadığını gözlemledik. 
Üreticilerin perakendecilere beklenenden daha karlı geri alım sözleşmeleri önermesi 
sonucu perakendeci karı artarken üretici karı beklenenden ciddi derecede daha düşük 
gerçekleşti. Toptan satış fiyatı üzerinden sözleşme ise, perakendecilerin fazla mal 
stoklaması sonucu beklenenden daha yüksek perakendeci ve tedarik zinciri karına yol 
açtı. Bir diğer önemli sonuç ise beklentilerin aksine, üretici-perakendeci ilişkisinin kısa 
vadeli olduğu deneylerde, uzun vadeli deneylere göre daha yüksek tedarik zinciri karı 
elde edilmesi oldu. Son olarak, deneklerin zamanla daha iyi kararlar vermeyi 
öğrendiklerine ve literatürde bahsedilen karar sezgisellerini kullandıklarına yönelik 
destek bulamadık. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Supply chains consist of individual firms, each aiming to maximize its own profit. It is 
well documented that the pursuit of individual profit maximization leads to suboptimal 
solutions from the supply chain point of view. This is why the study of contracts 
between supply chain members has attracted great attention in business as well as in 
academic literature.  A well crafted contract can align the incentives of the individual 
firms, leading to higher overall efficiency and higher gains for all parties, including the 
end-consumers. More than simply a pricing agreement, the contract is a tool to share 
profits, risks and information. 
Supply chain contracting and coordination literature has studied many different types of 
contracts and produced a wealth of analytical models (Cachon, 2003; Kaya and Ozer, 
2011). All of these models are based on a number of behavioral assumptions regarding 
how people make decisions (rational decision makers who aim to maximize their 
expected utility) and how people strategically interact (game-theoretic equilibrium 
concepts). While widely used in modeling, experimental economists have been 
challenging these assumptions through controlled experiments with human decision 
makers (Kagel and Roth 1995). These studies have uncovered significant differences 
between human decisions and the predictions of analytical models, and human 
behavior. Hence, it would be important to test the assumptions and predictions of 
analytical models through using such experiments before making managerial 
recommendations. This is particularly important for areas where “field studies” would 
be extremely difficult to conduct, such as supply chain contacting. Experiments uncover 
the gaps between theoretical predictions and human decisions, allowing the 
development of better analytical models that have higher explanatory and predictory 
prediction power. This approach may help bridge the long standing gap between 
operations management practice and research.   
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In this study, we consider the simplest supply chain involving inventory risk and 
contracting: A manufacturer-retailer supply chain where the retailer faces stochastic 
consumer demand. The manufacturer moves first by offering a contract to the retailer. If 
the retailer accepts the contract, she determines how much to order from the 
manufacturer and stock prior to the selling season. This is the only ordering opportunity 
for the retailer, making her problem a “newsvendor problem”.  
We consider two different contracts between the firms. (1) Wholesale price contract (w) 
where the wholesale price is w. This is the simplest possible contract where the retailer 
pays the wholesale price w per unit she buys. She cannot return unsold units to the 
manufacturer. According to the analytical solution, this contract causes the retailer to 
order less than the supply-chain-optimal stock quantity. This leads to inefficiency in the 
supply chain. (2) Buyback contract (w,b) where the manufacturer charges a wholesale 
price w, and buys back unsold units at a buyback price b. According to the analytical 
solution, this contract can coordinate the supply chain with the proper choice of contract 
parameters (w,b).   
We chose the buyback contract because it is easy to understand and provides a nice 
setting to study risk and profit sharing between firms. In addition, buyback contracts are 
widely used in industries such as publishing, pharmaceuticals and computer software 
and hardware (Padmanabhan and Png 1995, Wang and Webster 2009). Around 30% of 
new hardcover books are returned to the publishers by booksellers (Chopra and Meindl 
2007). Electronics manufacturers such as Intel provide returns policies to their 
distributors (Wang and Webster 2009). 
We aim to answer the following research questions: 
• How is the experimental performance of the contracts compare to the predictions of 
the analytical models?  In a similar study, Keser and Paleologo (2004) observed that 
the overall efficiency wholesale price contract is close to the predicted value; 
however, the profit is more equitably shared between the firms than predicted. We 
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extend their work by studying the buyback contract in addition to the wholesale 
price contract.  
 
• How do the experimental performances of buyback and wholesale price contracts 
compare with each other? Theory suggests that the buyback contract should 
outperform the wholesale price contract. In particular, the buyback contract is 
predicted to induce higher stock quantities from the retailer, leading to higher 
supply chain profits.  
 
• How does the length of relationship between subjects affect the results? One expects 
that in a longer-run relationship, firms learn about each other and may develop 
cooperation over time. At the same time, a long-run relationship runs the risk of 
firms engaging in strategic moves in the early periods to signal “toughness”.  
 
• What factors do retailers consider in setting stock quantities?  At the heart of our 
model is the retailer’s newsvendor decision. The manufacturer manipulates this 
decision through contract parameters he proposes. Numerous researchers have 
showed that people do not choose the newsvendor quantity in experiments. Decision 
makers are affected by irrelevant information, and resort to decision heuristics. We 
would like to understand what factors the retailer subjects consider in their stock 
quantity decisions. This has implications for contract design.  
 
• Do subjects learn to make better decisions over time?  We would like to understand 
if and how the subjects’ decisions change over time due to learning-by-doing. 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we summarize the related 
literature. In Chapter 3, we provide information on the analytical background of our 
problem. In Chapter 4, we explain our experimental setting and procedures. In Chapter 
5, we compare overall results of buyback contract experiments and wholesale price 
contract experiments, and we explain the individual experiments in detail. In Chapter 6, 
we discuss the decision heuristics. In Chapter 7, we conclude with discussions and 
future research suggestions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1. The Newsvendor Model  
The analytical model we consider revolves around the retailer’s newsvendor problem, 
and how the manufacturer can manipulate this problem through the choice of the 
contract parameters. The newsvendor problem, introduced by Arrow et al. (1951), is a 
fundamental building block in stochastic inventory theory (see for example, Petruzzi 
and Dada 1999, Khouja 1999, Porteus 2002). Arrow et al. came up with the famous 
“critical ratio” solution to the problem, capturing the fundamental trade-off between 
ordering too much and ordering too little relative to demand realization. The original 
model is about a newsvendor that needs to determine how many copies of a newspaper 
to order and stock at the beginning of a day, to meet stochastic demand during the day. 
However, the model is relevant to many different problem settings including inventory 
and capacity decisions in fashion and electronics industries; capacity management in 
service industries such as the airlines and hotels (Weatherford and Pfeifer 1994); and 
individual health care and insurance purchasing (Rosenfield 1986, Eeckhoudt et al. 
1991).  
Thanks to its simple and elegant nature, the newsvendor model has been used 
extensively in the development of more complicated stochastic inventory models. 
However, empirical studies indicate that managers do not necessarily follow the 
newsvendor solution in relevant problem settings. For example, Fisher and Raman 
(1996) report the case of a fashion company (Sport Obermeyer) that does not use the 
newsvendor model in order quantity decisions. Corbett and Fransoo (2007)’s survey 
shows that small businesses do partially follow the newsvendor logic for high-margin 
products but not for their best-selling products.  
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The newsvendor model, similar to any analytical model of human decision making, is 
based on a number of behavioral assumptions regarding how people make decisions. 
Human beings are assumed to be rational decision makers that aim to maximize 
expected profit level. However, a number of experimental studies involving human 
decision makers consistently found biases (i.e., observed systematic deviations in 
decision making) between theoretical predictions and subject decisions. Economists 
have been using such controlled laboratory experiments to study human decision 
making for a long time (see, for example, Kagel and Roth 1995). In fact, Daniel 
Kahneman and Vernon Smith co-received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for 
their pioneering work in experimental/behavioral economics. The use of 
experimental/behavioral methods in operations management has increased rapidly in 
the last years, leading to the emergence of the “behavioral operations management” 
field (see Bendoly et al. 2006, Gino and Pisano 2008).  
 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) conducted the first laboratory study of the newsvendor 
problem. These authors show that newsvendors (retailers) overorder for a low profit 
margin product, whereas they underorder for a high profit margin product. The authors 
show that this “ pull to center effect” cannot be explained  by risk preferences, prospect 
theory preferences, loss aversion, waste aversion, stockout aversion or an 
underestimation of opportunity costs. The authors offer the following three heuristics to 
explain their findings:  
• Mean anchor heuristic: The retailer anchors its decision on mean demand and then 
adjusts towards the optimal order quantity. 
• Chasing demand heuristic: The decision maker anchors on the previous order 
quantity and adjust toward the most recent demand observation.  
• Minimize ex-post inventory error: The decision maker regrets from not having 
ordered the realized demand, although it was not the optimal decision ex-ante.  
The first two are related to the “anchoring and insufficient adjustment” type heuristics 
where (Kahneman et al. 1982) people anchor their decisions around some available but 
irrelevant information, and insufficiently adjust around this value over time.  
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Bolton and Katok (2008) also observe the pull to center effect in their experiments. 
They show that the retailers’ order decisions can be improved through learning from 
experience, and by restricting them to place long-standing (10-periods) orders. Benzion 
et al. (2008) study different demand distributions and show that the previous-period 
bias is weakened over time. Bostian et al. (2008) show that the pull-to-center effect can 
be explained by an adaptive learning model where the subjects learn about the 
attractiveness of each order quantity alternative over time based on their past experience 
(EWA model).  Lurie and Swaminathan (2009) find that more frequent feedback does 
not necessarily improve newsvendor performance.  
Researchers have identified a number of “decision biases” to explain deviations from 
the optimal newsvendor quantity: 
• Different utility functions: The newsvendor model assumes that the decision 
maker’s objective is to maximize his expected profit. However, experimental 
studies have identified other utility functions. These are related to the Prospect 
Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
 
o Risk aversion: Eeckhoudt et al. (1995) show analytically that a risk-averse 
newsvendor will order less than a risk-neutral one. Prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) predicts that people act risk averse in the 
domain of gains, but risk-seeking in the domain of losses (reflection effect). 
Corbett and Fransoo (2007)’s survey results confirm this prediction for small 
business owners facing newsvendor problems.  
 
o Loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1974). People are more averse to 
losses than they like same-sized gains. Wang and Webster (2006) show 
analytically that a loss-averse newsvendor will order less than a risk-neutral 
newsvendor when the shortage cost is low.  
 
o Framing: People’s decisions are affected by the way the problem is 
presented (Tversky and Kahneman 1984). Schultz et al. (2007) compare the 
newsvendor results under a positive frame that highlights profit, and a 
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negative one that highlights costs. To their surprise, experiments indicate no 
significant difference. Ho and Zhang (2008) illustrate the effect of framing 
in the supply chain contracting domain.   
 
• Bounded rationality: Standard economic theory assumes that people rationally 
choose the “best response” among alternatives. However, in practice, people make 
noisy decisions. They may make calculation or recording errors due to limited 
cognitive ability, limited memory and attention span. When faced with complex 
decision situations, people may resort to decision heuristics as shortcuts. Su (2008) 
generalizes the newsvendor model to account for bounded rationality using a 
quantal response equilibrium (QRE) framework. This framework acknowledges that 
people do not always make the best decision, but good decisions have a higher 
probability of being made than worse ones. Gavirneni and Isen (2008) record and 
analyze the thought process of newsvendor subjects in experiments. They find that 
most subjects correctly identified the overage and underage costs, but failed to 
convert this into the optimal order quantity. This finding suggests that the 
newsvendor problem may not be as intuitive as thought by researchers. 
  
• Irrational behavior: Becker-Peth et al. (2009) analyze how subjects respond to 
different parameters of the buyback contract, and use experiment data to generate 
response functions to estimate the mean orders, order variances and expected 
profits. The authors show that although the newsvendor subjects act irrationally, 
their decisions can be predicted very accurately using these response functions.  
 
• Overconfidence: Croson et al. (2008) show that newsvendor subjects have a biased 
belief that the demand distribution has a lower variance than its true variance. The 
authors show that this overconfidence bias leads to suboptimal order quantities, and 
they develop incentive contracts to induce optimal newsvendor quantities. 
 
• Cultural differences: Feng et al. (2010) are the first to diagnose cross-cultural 
differences in the newsvendor problem. They show that the “pull-to-center” effect is 
more significant for Chinese decision makers than American decision makers.  
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2.2. Supply Chain Contracting and Coordination  
In a typical supply chain, each firm aims to maximize its own profit, and this 
decentralized decision making reduces total supply chain profits (Spengler 1950). 
Supply chain contracts can be used to align the incentives of the firms with that of the 
supply chain, leading to supply chain “coordination”. A coordinated supply chain 
achieves the profit level of a centralized firm. As summarized in Cachon (2003), 
researchers have studied different contract types to achieve coordination. Similar to our 
setting, these studies generally involve one manufacturer and one retailer, where the 
retailer faces the newsvendor problem. We compare the performances of the wholesale 
price contract, which is inefficient according to theory, with the buyback contract, 
which is a coordinating contract. Other coordinating contracts discussed in literature 
include quantity flexibility (Tsay 1999), revenue sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2005), 
rebate (Taylor 2002) and quantity discount (Tomlin 2003).  
 
Pasternack (1985) was the first to show that a buyback contract can coordinate a supply 
chain. Donohue (2000) extends this work by considering a second purchase 
opportunity. Taylor (2002) shows that a combination of buyback and target rebate 
contracts can coordinate the supply chain when demand is a function of the retailer’s 
sales effort. Emmons and Gilbert (1998) and Kandel (1996) study coordination with 
buyback contracts when demand is price-sensitive. 
 
Experimental work on supply chain contracting where the retailer faces a newsvendor 
problem is scarce. Katok and Wu (2009) study the buyback and revenue sharing 
contracts, focusing on their coordination capabilities. These authors, however, conduct 
experiments where only the manufacturer or the retailer is human; whereas the other 
firm is computerized. Hence, they ignore the strategic interaction between two human 
players. Our work is an extension of Keser and Paleologo (2004). These authors study a 
manufacturer-retailer supply chain under a wholesale price contract, and conduct 
experiments where both sides are human. They find that manufacturers charge lower 
wholesale prices than predicted, and the retailers understock (contrary to Schweitzer 
and Cachon’s observation) relative to the newsvendor quantity. As a result, total profits 
are around the theoretical predicted values; yet, the profits are more equitably shared 
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between the two firms. The authors find support for a decision heuristic where the 
retailers anchor on some price-quantity combination in the first period and adjust 
around this point based on the changes in the offered wholesale price. We extend Keser 
and Paleologo’s work by comparing the wholesale price contract with the buyback 
contract and by comparing long-run and short-run relationships between the subjects. 
Some of our findings support theirs; however, there are also differences.   
Marketing literature also studies supply chain coordination. In marketing models, the 
retailer faces a deterministic downward sloping demand function (Tirole 1998) rather 
than the newsvendor problem. The retailer does not face any inventory risk due to the 
deterministic nature of the problem. Rather than determining the stock quantity, the 
retailer determines the “sales price” to consumers, which in turn determines the sales 
and stock quantity according to the demand function. Supply chain inefficiency due to 
decentralized decision making is present, and is known as the “double marginalization 
problem” (Spengler 1950). The retailer sets a higher sales price than the supply chain 
optimum, leading to lower sales quantity, and lower total supply chain.  
 
Within this setting, Ho and Zhang (2008) show that contrary to analytical models’ 
predictions; the introduction of a fixed fee does not improve the supply chain’s profit. 
In addition, the framing of the fixed fee makes a difference: A quantity discount results 
in higher chain profit than a two-part tariff. The authors develop a behavioral model to 
explain the outcome based on the two contracts’ differences with respect to (1) framing 
(through loss aversion) (2) contract complexity (through bounded rationality).  Lim and 
Ho (2007) find that increasing the number of blocks in a pricing contract from one to 
two increases channel profits, but not as much as predicted. Furthermore, contrary to 
theoretical prediction, increasing the number of blocks from two to three increases 
channel efficiency further. The authors explain this result by a Quantal-Response 
Equilibrium (QRE) model that accounts for retailers’ sensitivity to counterfactual 
profits.  
Özer et al. (2011) study the role of trust in forecast information sharing by using the 
wholesale price contract. They analyze whether and how cooperation can arise without 
complex contracts and reputation-building mechanisms by conducting experiments.  
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The information sharing and supply chain coordination literature assumes that supply 
chain members either absolutely trust each other and cooperate or do not trust each 
other at all. Contrary to this all-or-nothing view, Özer et al. find a continuum between  
these two extremes when people share information. 
Supply chain contracting requires the study of relations between at least two 
independent decision makers (firms). This requires one to think about strategic/social 
factors in addition to individual decision biases we discussed in Section2.1. For 
example, rather than being purely self-interested, as assumed by standard economic 
theory, people may also care about “fairness” and the well being of the others. In an 
analytical study, Cui et al. (2007) show that a simple wholesale price contract can 
achieve coordination when firms are concerned about fairness. Pavlov and Katok 
(2009) develop a model to explain contract rejections and the more equitable sharing of 
profits between the firms where the manufacturer has incomplete information regarding 
the retailer’s preference for fairness. Loch and Wu (2008) study the effect of social 
considerations in a wholesale price contracting setting where the manufacturer and the 
retailer interact repeatedly, similar to our long-run relationship experiments. These 
authors show that relationship and status seeking considerations can shift the 
equilibrium behavior of the subjects significantly. Haruvy et al. (2011) find that 
allowing negotiation between the subjects significantly increases the efficiency of 
coordinating contracts relative to the wholesale price contract. The manufacturers offer 
more efficient contracts and retailer rejections are almost eliminated when the firms can 
negotiate.  
2.3. Bullwhip Effect  
Here, we discuss the research on the bullwhip effect. Although we do not study the 
bullwhip effect, we provide a short literature summary on it, because it is one of the 
most studied areas in the behavioral operations management literature. Bullwhip effect 
is the phenomenon of increasing order variability in the supply chain as one moves 
from downstream firms (such as the retailer) to upstream firms (such as the raw 
material supplier). While consumer demand for specific products does not change 
much, inventory and back-order levels are often observed to fluctuate considerably 
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across the supply chain. This variability is detrimental to firms’ performance as it 
increases operational costs and reduces service levels. In an analytical study, Lee et al. 
(1997) identified the four common “operational” causes of the bullwhip effect as 
demand signal processing, order batching, rationing gaming and price variations. In 
addition to these operational causes, the bullwhip effect also has “behavioral causes”.  
The bullwhip effect can be studied by simulations of “Beer Distribution Game”, a role-
playing simulation of a simple production and distribution system developed by MIT in 
the 1960s (Simchi-Levi et al., 2008). Sterman (1989) was the first to use the beer game 
to test the existence of the bullwhip effect in an experimental setting. He explained the 
major behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect as “misperceptions of feedback” and 
“participants’ tendency to underweight the supply line”.  
 
Croson and Donohue (2003) show that the bullwhip effect still exists when one 
removes all operational causes. Croson  and  Donohue (2005)  show that access to 
downstream inventory information significantly reduces order fluctuation, with the 
most significant improvement at upstream levels. If upstream inventory information is 
accessible, however, no significant improvement is gained throughout the supply chain. 
On the contrary, Steckel et al. (2004) show that sharing point of sale information results 
in increasing costs, when the distribution of demand is non-stationary and unknown. 
Wu and Katok (2006) show that if supply chain partners are allowed to communicate 
and share their knowledge, supply chain performance improves significantly. 
Otherwise, individually improved knowledge does not increase the whole system’s 
efficiency. Croson and Donohue (2006) find that underweighting of the supply line is 
present when customer demand is stationary and announced to all echelons.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND 
3.1. Buyback Contract Model 
Consider a manufacturer who produces a product and a retailer who sells the product to 
consumers. At the beginning of the relation, the manufacturer determines the contract 
parameters wholesale price w, and buyback price b, and offers the contract to the 
retailer. Given the contract parameters, the retailer determines her stock quantity, Q. If 
the retailer’s expected profit with this stock quantity is negative, the retailer rejects the 
contract. Else, the retailer orders this quantity from the manufacturer. This is the only 
opportunity to order for the retailer. The manufacturer produces Q units at a per unit 
cost of c, and delivers these units to the retailer. The retailer stocks this quantity before 
the selling season. Finally, random consumer demand D is realized during the selling 
season.  
• If the realized consumer demand turns out to be lower than the retailer’s stock 
quantity (i.e., if D<Q), some products are unsold at the retailer. As agreed in the 
contract, the manufacturer buys back these leftover units from the retailer by 
paying her b per unit.  
• If the realized consumer demand turns out to be higher than the retailer’s stock 
quantity (i.e., If D>Q), some demand will be unsatisfied. There is no extra 
penalty for unsatisfied demand to either firm; however, the firms lose the 
opportunity to make more profit.  
The sequence of events can be summarized as follows: 
1. The manufacturer offers a buyback contract (w, b). 
2. If the retailer’s expected profit level is non-negative, the retailer accepts the 
contract and determines her stock quantity Q. 
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3. The manufacturer produces Q units at a cost of c each, and ships these to the 
retailer. 
4. Random consumer demand D realizes at the retailer. 
5.  The retailer sells the products to the customer at a cost of p per unit to satisfy 
the demand. 
6. If there are leftover units at the retailer, the manufacturer buys back these by 
paying the retailer the buyback price b per unit. The manufacturer salvages these 
units and gains the salvage value v per unit.  
The firms are risk neutral. Each aims to maximize its expected profit. To determine the 
manufacturer and the retailer’s decisions, and to calculate the expected sales quantity 
and profit levels, one can solve this game backwards to find the subgame perfect 
equilibrium. First, one solves the retailer’s problem below: 
 
		
 = [min, ] + [ −min	, ] − 	 
    
                      =	  − [min, ] −	 − .                             (1) 
 
Given the contract parameters w and b, the retailer faces the standard newsvendor 
problem (Nahmias 2009). The retailer’s optimal stock quantity is found as: 
 
																																							∗,  		= 		   	 !"!"#!$% 		= 		  	&'&
%.                               (2) 
  
where (.) is the inverse cumulative distribution function of demand D, cu is the cost 
of underage, and co is the cost of overage. The term  	&'&
%	is the referred to as the 
“critical ratio”. 
 
In the case that the demand is uniformly distributed between )*+	and	)./, retailer’s 
optimal stock quantity is 
																																							∗,  = 	  	&'&
% ∗ )./ − )*+ +	)*+.                          (3) 
 
Q 
17 
 
The manufacturer anticipates the retailer’s Q* selection as a function of the contract 
parameters (w,b) that he offers. Substituting Q*(w,b), the manufacturer’s problem 
becomes 
 
																		)
 =  − 0∗ −  − 1[∗ −2∗, ].                      (4) 
 
This function is not jointly concave in w and b (see Lariviere 1997). Hence, one cannot 
find a closed form solution for the manufacturer’s optimal contract parameters. Instead, 
one can use a numeric procedure to determine the manufacturer’s optimal contract 
parameters (w*, b*) through a grid search over possible (w,b) combinations. Using 
these contract parameters, one can then calculate the retailer’s stock quantity, the 
expected sales quantity, and the expected profits of the two firms. 
3.1.1 Supply-Chain Optimal Solution 
The preceding analysis solves the problem from the manufacturer’s point of view. One 
is also interested in the decision values that maximize the supply chain’s total expected 
profit (i.e., the sum of manufacturer and retailer’s expected profits). The supply chain’s 
problem is formulated as 
 
																											343.56!  =  − 1[min, ] −	0 − 1	.                (5) 
 
This is also a newsvendor problem. Note that the contract parameters (w,b) are 
irrelevant for the supply chain’s problem because these decisions are between the 
supply chain firms. The stock quantity that maximizes the supply chain’s expected 
profit is: 
 
																																															6! =   	 !"!"#!$% =   	&!&7%                                         (6) 
 
The supply chain’s expected profit with stock quantity Qsc is equal to 
 
																															343.56! 6! =  − 1[min6! , ]	–	0 − 16! .                       (7) 
w, b 
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We observe that the supply chain expected profit is a function of the retailer’s stock 
quantity decision Q. It is not affected directly by the manufacturer’s contract term 
decisions (w,b). Hence, if the retailer chooses Qsc, the supply chain achieves its 
theoretical maximum expected profit. In this case, the supply chain is said to be 
coordinated. The maximum profit level is known as the integrated firm profit (or, the 
centralized solution) because this is what a vertically-integrated firm would achieve.  
In this setting, manufacturer’s contract parameters (w, b) have two functions: 
1) They affect the retailer’s stock quantity Q choice. From equation (4), one 
can verify that any (w, b) pair that satisfies    = 	 &'#7!	7'&! 	 causes the 
retailer to choose Qsc as her stock quantity. 
 
2) They determine how the total supply chain profit is to be shared between the 
firms. Higher w values favor the manufacturer whereas higher b values favor 
the retailer.  
Hence, if the manufacturer offers contract parameters (w,b) that satisfy   =
	&'#7!	7'&!  , the supply chain expected profit is maximized. However, the 
manufacturer’s objective is to maximize his own expected profit, and he does not 
choose (w,b) that would theoretically result in Qsc as the contract parameters. This 
causes the supply chain expected profit to be suboptimal, leading to supply chain 
“inefficiency”. The ratio of the total supply chain profit under a given contract to the 
integrated firm profit level is referred to as the “efficiency” of the contract. 
3.1.2 Our Experimental Setting and its Analytical Solution 
We consider the following parameters: 
• Unit production cost, 0 = 50	
• Retail price,  = 250 
• Salvage value, 1 = 0  (i.e., no salvage value) 
• Demand, D, uniformly distributed between 40 and 230, and can take only 
integer values. 
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• The decision variables (, ,  are expected to take only integer values.  
 
These are the parameter values used by Keser and Paleologo (2004). Given these 
parameters, the manufacturer’s wholesale price satisfies  ≥ 0 = 50  and  ≤  =
250. For a chosen w, the buyback price satisfies 0 ≤  ≤ .  
 
3.1.2.1. Retailer’s Problem 
Given a contract (w,b), from Equation (3), the retailer’s best response (i.e., optimal) 
stock quantity is 
∗,  = 190 ∗ 	@	250 − 250 − A + 	40	 
 
 
Figure 3.1.1 Theoretical Best Response for a Given Contract (w,b)  
 
 
Figure 3.1.1 illustrates Q*(w,b). We observe that the retailer’s best response stock 
quantity increases with the buyback price and decreases with the wholesale price. The 
contract parameters (w,b) that satisfy  = 	 CDE'DECEE 	 coordinate the supply chain and 
maximize the total supply chain profit. Such contracts cause the retailer to order the 
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supply chain optimal stock quantity of Qsc=192. From Figure 3.1.1, we observe that 
other (w,b) values cause the retailer to order and stock a lower quantity.   
Given decisions (w, b, Q*(w,b)), one can calculate the retailer’s profit for a given 
consumer demand, D realization as follows: 
 
   	
,  = [min, ] + [ −min	, ] − 	 
         					= 	  − [min, ] −	 − .                                (8) 
 
Recall that we assume each firm to act risk neutral, in which case its objective is to 
maximize its expected profit level. Retailer’s expected profit is calculated over all 
possible demand realizations, which are integer values between 40 and 230. Because 
there are 191 possible integer values in this domain, each one is realized with a 
probability of 1/191.  
 
 
Figure 3.1.2 Retailer’s Expected Profit 
  
Figure 3.1.2 shows the retailer’s expected profit as a function of contract parameters 
when she chooses her best response stock quantity Q*(w, b). We observe that not 
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surprisingly, the retailer’s expected profit is maximized when the manufacturer sets 
 =  = 50 . Because 	 =  , the retailer is under no risk, and hence, stocks the 
maximum possible demand quantity Q = 230. The profit margin p-w is also at the 
maximum possible value. However, it is not likely that the manufacturer will set 
 =  = 50	because this means selling the product to the retailer at the unit production 
cost, and also buying back unsold quantities at full wholesale price. In fact,  =  =
50 yields a negative expected profit value of -4,750 for the manufacturer.  
3.1.2.2 Manufacturer’s Problem 
The manufacturer anticipates the retailer’s best response stock quantity Q*(w, b) choice 
for any contract (w,b) he may offer. Given the (w,b,Q*(w,b)) values, the manufacturer 
can calculate his expected profit over the random consumer demand realization. This 
expected profit is shown in Figure 3.1.3 as a function of (w,b). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.3 Manufacturer’s Expected Profit 
 
We observe that for a given b value, manufacturer’s expected profit first increases with 
w, and then decreases. The direction of change depends on the retailer’s best response 
22 
 
quantity decision Q*(w,b). For example, if we fix  = 80, the manufacturer’s expected 
profit is -700 for  =  = 80. For 80 ≤  ≤ 183, the manufacturer’s expected profit 
increases. After  = 183, we observe a decrease in manufacturer’s expected profit.  As 
w increases, the manufacturer’s profit margin per unit sold to retailer increases; 
however, the retailer stocks fewer units. Therefore, we cannot tell whether the 
manufacturer’s expected profit increases or decreases in b for a given w value. The 
direction of change, again depends on the retailer’s best response quantity decision 
Q*(w,b). For example, if one sets  = 180, manufacturer’s expected profit is 12,116 
for  = 0, increases with b until  = 143, and then decreases.    
 
Through a grid search, we find the contract parameters that maximize the 
manufacturer’s expected profit as ∗ = 247 and ∗ = 246. Given these parameters, the 
retailer sets a stock quantity of Q*= 183. The resulting expected profits for the 
manufacturer, retailer and the total supply chain are 22,790, 333 and 23,123 
respectively. 
 
Note that the manufacturer’s optimum w and b are quite close to their maximum levels 
of  = 250, and to each other. The manufacturer finds it optimal to sell the product at a 
high wholesale price, but at the same time, offer a generous buyback policy. With such 
a contract, the manufacturer is assuming most of the inventory risk in the supply chain. 
The retailer’s critical ratio is 0.75, leading to a high stock quantity. This outcome is due 
to the relatively low unit production cost (0 = 50) with respect to the high sales price 
( = 250).  
3.1.2.3 Supply Chain Optimal Solution 
Figure 3.1.4 illustrates supply chain expected profit as a function of the contract 
parameters.  
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Figure 3.1.4 Total Supply Chain Expected Profit for every (w,b) pair 
 
We observe that the highest expected supply chain profit occurs for ,  values that 
satisfy ∗ =	 CDE'DECDEDE 	= D'J − 62.5 . This is an expected outcome. These ,  pairs 
satisfy the coordination condition and coordinate the supply chain. In other words, 
given these (w,b) couples, the retailer’s critical ratio is equal to the supply chain’s 
critical ratio  of 0.80. As a result, the retailer chooses 6! = 192 as the stock quantity, 
leading to a total supply chain expected profit of 23,200.  
 
Recall that in the manufacturer’s optimal solution, we found the retailer to set Q* =183, 
leading to a supply chain expected profit of 23,123. The efficiency of the contract in the 
manufacturer’s optimal solution is then equal to 23,123	/	23,200	 = 	99.67%, which is 
quite high. That is, the solution that maximizes the manufacturer’s profit is also a good 
one from the supply chain point of view. Note however that this solution leaves only a 
small expected profit of 333 to the retailer.  
 
24 
 
3.2. Wholesale Price Contract Model 
Next, we provide the solution of the same model under a wholesale price contract.  
Note that the wholesale price contract model is a special case of the buyback contract 
model. The sequence of events is the same except that the manufacturer does not buy 
back unsold inventory from the retailer. To carry out the analysis, we simply substitute 
 = 0 in the buyback contract analysis. The retailer’s problem becomes, 
 
																																												' = [min, ] − 	.                                 (9) 
    
The quadratic and concave objective function implies a unique optimum 
																																																																	∗	 =   &!& %.                               (10) 
 
Because demand is uniformly distributed in our experimental setting, the unique 
optimum, as validated also by our simulation, is 
  
   ∗ = 	 M)./ − 'NOPQNORS& 			T	 < 																					0																			T	 ≥  V   .                       (11) 
       
The manufacturer anticipates the retailer’s Q* selection as a function of the contract 
parameter w he offers. Substituting Q*(w), the manufacturer’s problem becomes 
 
																																																			)' =  − 0	Q∗ .                                         (12) 
 
The objective function of the manufacturer is quadratic and concave in the interval 
[0, ] and is equal to zero if w>p. The optimal wholesale price is found as  
 
																																																	∗ = min X, !C+	&C NOPQNOPQNORSY                                        (13) 
 
In the subgame perfect solution of the game, the manufacturer offers the wholesale 
price, w*, and the retailer’s stock quantity is  
Q 
w 
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									∗∗ = 	NOPQC − 	0  NOPQNORSC& %.                                    (14) 
 
Alternatively, one may use a numeric procedure to determine the manufacturer’s 
optimal wholesale price, w*, through a grid search over possible w values. Using this 
wholesale price, one can then calculate the retailer’s stock quantity, expected sales 
quantity, and the expected profits of the two firms. 
3.2.1 Our Experimental Setting and its Analytical Solution 
Based on numerical calculations, we find the wholesale price that maximizes the 
manufacturer’s expected profit as w* = 176. Given this w*, the retailer sets a stock 
quantity of Q* = 96. The resulting expected profits for the manufacturer, retailer and the 
supply chain are 12,126, 5,011 and 17,137 respectively. 
3.2.1.1 Supply Chain Optimal Solution 
The wholesale price that maximizes the total supply chain profit is 6! = 0 =
50.	Given this wholesale price, the retailer would choose Qsc = 192 as the stock 
quantity. Total supply chain expected profit would be 23,200. Note that this is equal to 
the optimal total supply chain profit (i.e., the integrated firm profit) we discussed in 
Section 3.1.2.3. The integrated firm profit is a benchmark independent of the contract 
used between the firms. The efficiency of a particular contract is calculated as the total 
supply chain profit under that contract to the integrated firm profit.  
While 6! = 0 = 50	maximizes the total supply chain profit, it is not likely that the 
manufacturer will set this wholesale price. Because this means selling the product to the 
retailer at the unit production cost, yielding no profit to the manufacturer. The 
manufacturer is predicted to set his own optimal w*=176, leading to a total supply 
chain profit of 17,137. The efficiency of this contract is 17,137	/	23,200	 = 	74%.  
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3.3.  Comparison of the Analytical Solutions Under Two Contracts 
Table 3.3.1 compares the manufacturer’s optimal solution under the two contracts.  
 
Table 3.3.1 Comparison of Manufacturer’s Optimal Solution under Two Contracts 
Type of 
Contract 
Total 
Profit 
Contract 
Efficiency 
Mfg. 
Profit 
Retailer 
Profit 
w b Q 
Buyback 23,123 99.67% 22,790 333 247 246 183 
Wholesale Price 17,137 74.00% 12,126 5,011 176 -- 96 
 
We observe that the manufacturer’s optimal solution under the buyback contract 
dominates the one under wholesale price contract in parameters of total profits. This is 
primarily due to differences between the retailer’s stock quantities. In fact, the 
efficiency under the buyback contract is close to 100%. This sounds like good news 
from the supply chain point of view. However, the profit distribution under the buyback 
contract is quite disturbing. The retailer’s share of the profit is negligible with almost all 
profit going to the manufacturer. The wholesale price contract, on the other hand, while 
inefficient, offers the retailer a decent profit level.  
 
Note that this is only a theoretical comparison which assumes that (1) the retailer will 
accept any contract that provides her nonzero expected profit; (2) the retailer will 
determine her stock quantity according to the newsvendor formula. As we will discuss, 
both of these assumptions are questionable when real human beings make decisions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
In this chapter we present our experimental design and procedure.  
4.1. Experimental Design 
We used the following parameter setting in all experiments: 
• Unit production cost, 0 = 50 
• Retail price,  = 250 
• Salvage value, 1 = 0 (i.e., no salvage value) 
• Demand, D, uniformly distributed between 40 and 230, and can take only 
integer values. 
• The decision variables (w, b, Q) can only take integer values.  
• Number of participants is denoted by n. 
 
As illustrated in Table 4.1.1, we use two levels of experimental manipulations:  
• Contract type manipulation 
o Buyback contract: The manufacturer offers a buyback contract (w,b)  
o Wholesale price contract: The manufacturer offers a wholesale price 
contract (w)  
 
• Relationship length manipulation:  
o Long run: The same manufacturer-retailer pair interacts in all 30 periods. 
o Short run: The manufacturer-retailer pairs are re-assigned randomly in 
each period.   
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Table 4.1.1 Experimental Design and Number of Subjects 
Contract Type 
Buyback Wholesale price 
R
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Experiment b1a, n=12 
Experiment b1b, n=16 
                                            
Experiment w1a, n=16 
Experiment w1b, n=16 
Experiment w1c, n=16 
S
h
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n
 
                                               
Experiment b2a, n=12 
Experiment b2b, n=16 
                                            
Experiment w2a, n=16 
Experiment w2b, n=16 
Experiment w2c, n=16 
 
4.2. Experimental Procedure  
Our experiments are computer-based and were conducted at the CAFE (Center for 
Applied Finance Education) computer laboratory of Sabancı University, Faculty of 
Management. We coded1 and implemented the experimental model using HP MUMS 
Software.  
Subjects are selected from Sabancı University MS 401 course Spring semester 
2010/2011 students. These students had already studied the basic newsvendor problem. 
To provide incentive, we converted the subjects’ total profit at the end of the 
experimental session into a bonus grade for the course MS 401. The bonus ranged 
between 1% and 2.5%, and it is applied to the final grade of the subject in that course. 
We distributed instructions to the subjects before they arrive at the laboratory. Sample 
                                                 
1 Appendix A provides the main script code that is used to define the number of subjects, and to call other 
functional scripts, as an example. Appendix B illustrates another important part of the code where the 
parameters, stages and the allocation strategy of subjects to the roles are defined. 
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instructions are provided in Appendix C. At the beginning of each session, we 
explained the experiment once again to ensure that the instructions are clearly 
understood, and we answered any remaining questions. Before starting the actual 
experiment, we let the subjects play three pilot (training) periods. During the actual 
experiments, we did not allow the subjects to communicate with each other. Each 
experimental session took around two hours.  
Each experimental session contained one experiment (treatment) composed of 30 
independent periods (rounds). Throughout a given experiment, a particular subject 
played the role of either manufacturer or retailer. The role was randomly assigned at the 
beginning of the experiment and remained unchanged in all of the 30 periods. We did 
not conduct any experiment where a particular subject may play different roles in 
different periods. This is consistent with the Keser and Paleologo (2004).  
We use the term “game” to denote the interaction in a manufacturer-retailer pair in a 
period. The sequence of events in the game reflects the three stage interaction in the 
analytical model. At stage I of the game, the manufacturer sets the contract parameters 
wholesale price and buyback price (in buyback contract experiments). At stage II, these 
contract parameters are displayed on the retailer’s screen and the retailer determines her 
stock quantity. At stage III, random consumer demand is realized. The results of the 
game are then reported to the subjects. Each subject is given around 30 seconds to make 
his decision.  
Appendices D and E provide sample screenshots of the manufacturer and the retailer’s 
screens respectively in the buyback contract experiments. The large table in the middle 
of the screen is the “decision support tool”. By using this tool, the subjects could run 
what-if analysis before submitting their decisions. A retailer subject can enter a stock 
quantity to this tool and obtain the outcome for eight different realizations of the 
stochastic consumer demand (For D = 40, 70, 100, 130, 160, 190, 220, 230). The 
manufacturer also has a decision support tool. However, he needs to enter contract 
parameters (w, b), as well as a value for the retailer’s stock quantity decision to the tool. 
More detailed explanation about the decision support tool can be found in Appendix C 
where we provide the instructions. 
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Subjects enter their decisions into the cells at the bottom of the screens. At the end of 
each period, a results screen (as seen in Appendix F) provides the subjects with the 
results of their game. The game results include the consumer demand realization; the 
decisions of both firms, number of units sold, and number of units unsold, demand 
unsatisfied, the period profit and cumulative profit of both firms. These results are 
provided for all periods up to and including the last period.  
After each experiment, we conducted a post-experiment survey where we asked the 
subjects how they made their decisions, whether they were motivated by the bonus 
grade and their suggestions. These surveys indicated that the subjects were highly 
motivated for their decisions, and they gave us clues about their decision heuristics.  
4.3. Experimental Data Analysis 
Before presenting our result in Chapter 5, here we discuss how we analyzed 
experimental data. The two firms make a number of decisions in the model, and at the 
last stage, random demand is realized. We repeat the decision structure of the buyback 
contract model below: 
1. The manufacturer determines the contract parameters (w,b). In theory, the 
manufacturer makes this decision by evaluating all possible contract parameter 
combinations, and choosing the one that gives him the highest expected profit. 
The chosen contract parameters determine 
 
• The critical ratio: This determines the newsvendor quantity.   
• Retailer’s expected profit: This determines the “attractiveness” of the 
contract from the retailer’s point of view. Lower wholesale price values 
and higher buyback price values result in more attractive contracts.  
• Expected profit shares of the manufacturer and retailer. 
 
2. The retailer determines whether to accept or reject the contract. In theory, the 
retailer accepts any contract that provides her a non-negative expected profit.  
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3. If the contract is accepted, the retailer determines the stock quantity Q.  In 
theory, the retailer determines the quantity through the newsvendor model as 
Q*= F
-1
(critical ratio).  
4. Finally, random demand D is realized.  
Given this sequence, we compare the experimental data with two benchmarks: 
1) Manufacturer’s optimal outcome: The subgame-perfect equilibrium of the model 
corresponds to the manufacturer’s optimal outcome (in each period). This is because the 
manufacturer is the first-mover in the game. In this outcome, the manufacturer offers 
the contract (w*=247, b*=246), and the retailer stocks the corresponding newsvendor 
quantity Q*(w*, b*) = 183.  Manufacturer’s expected profit is 22,790 and retailer’s 
expected profit is 333. This is what the theory predicts as the outcome of the overall 
interaction between the two firms in a given period. 
2) Newsvendor prediction (predicted outcome): In experiments, manufacturer 
subjects do not necessarily offer their optimal contract (w*, b*). We define the 
“predicted outcome” as the expected outcome of the interaction given any contract (w, 
b), assuming that the retailer chooses the newsvendor stock quantity Q*(w, b). The 
difference between the “predicted outcome” and real experiment data is due to the 
retailer’s deviation from the newsvendor model, and due to the realization of random 
demand.  
4.3.1 The Unit of Analysis 
Each experiment (treatment) consists of 30 periods, and in each period we have 6 to 8 
manufacturer-retailer pairs making decisions (each corresponding to a “game”). The 
main unit of analysis we use is the period averages across manufacturer-retailer pairs. 
Hence, each experiment yields 30 data points. For some experiments, we also report 
analyses on subject-level data. 
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4.3.2 Contract Rejections 
If the retailer rejects the contract through setting Q=0, both firms obtain zero profit. 
Consistent with the literature, we exclude the games with rejected contracts from the 
main analysis. We provide information on rejected contracts separately. Appendix G 
provides the summary results with and without rejected contracts. Note that the number 
of rejected contracts is not large in our experiments, and rejections do not affect our 
major results. Overall, only 1.8% of the proposed contacts were rejected. The highest 
percentage of rejected contracts in an experiment was 4.5% (in Experiment w2c).  
4.3.3 What Do We Measure? 
Primarily, we keep track of the subjects decisions’ over periods. These are the contract 
parameters (w,b), and the stock quantity Q. Given these decisions and the realization of 
the random demand, D, we also calculate profit-related measures. These include 
retailer’s profit, manufacturer’s profit, total profit, contract efficiency (Total profit / 
integrated firm profit level) and profit shares of firms. In addition, we keep track of the 
retailer’s predicted newsvendor profit corresponding to a given contract (w,b). 
4.3.4 What Are We Interested In? 
We are primarily interested in (1) Observing and comparing the experimental 
performances of the buyback and wholesale price contracts (2) Understanding the effect 
of the relationship length. In addition to these, we also aim to uncover if and how the 
subjects’ decisions evolve over time. In particular, we expect to observe some “learning 
by doing” over time because the subjects are provided with results at the end of each 
period. Finally, we would like to understand the “decision heuristics” that the subjects 
might be using in making their decisions.  
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4.3.5 Statistical Tests  
We have no prior assumptions on the distributions of the assessed variables; therefore 
we used non-parametric statistical tests (Siegel, 1956) such as the Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test and the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test (the Mann-Whitney U test) to test statistical 
significance.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5. RESULTS 
In this chapter, we first make an overall comparison across all experiments to 
understand the effects of the relationship length and the contract type. The goal is to 
provide big-picture results. Then, we present a detailed analysis on our experiments.  
5.1. Overall Comparison Results 
Here, we compare experimental results to understand the effects of relationship length 
and the contract type. The unit of analysis is the mean value in a period across all games 
(i.e., manufacturer-retailer pairs) in a given experiment. Hence, each experiment yields 
30 data points, corresponding to 30 periods. To obtain strong results, we pooled the data 
of similar experiments together. For example, by pooling the data of Experiments b1a 
and b1b, we obtain 60 data points for b1 experiments. Table 5.1.1. summarizes the 
comparison. 
Table 5.1.1 Overall Comparisons 
Contract Type 
Buyback Wholesale Price 
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b1 experiments 
60 data points 
w1 experiments 
90 data points 
S
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b2 experiments 
60 data points 
w2 experiments 
90 data points 
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In what follows, we first discuss the results of the buyback contract experiments. We 
compare the data with the manufacturer’s optimal solution. Then, we compare the long 
and short run relationship results. Next, we discuss the results of the wholesale price 
experiments. Finally, we compare the buyback and wholesale price contract experiment 
results.  
5.1.1. Buyback Contract Experiments 
Table 5.1.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the buyback contract experiments. 
Bold p-values represent the results with significant median differences according to 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. 
Table 5.1.2 Comparison of Buyback Experiments  
Buyback 
Contract 
Mfg. 
Optimal  
Buyback 
All  
(m+n=120) 
p-value 
Long Run  
(b1,  m=60) 
Short Run  
(b2, n=60) 
p-value 
Total  23,123 Mean 19,010 
 
18,697 19,323 
 
Profit 
 
Median 18,375 0.000 18,000 18,700 0.000 
  
Stdev 8,724 
 
9,278 9,228 
 
Mfg.  22,790 Mean 13,297 
 
13,714 12,879 
 
Profit 
 
Median 12,725 0.000 12,513 12,490 0.004 
  
Stdev 5,135 
 
6,232 4,989 
 
Retailer  333 Mean 5,714 
 
4,983 6,444 
 
Profit 
 
Median 5,743 0.000 4,365 7,000 0.004 
  
Stdev 6,494 
 
6,211 6,603 
 
Retailer 333 Mean 6,143 
 
5,414 6,872 
 
Predicted 
 
Median 6,201 0.000 4,892 7,087 0.000 
Profit 
 
Stdev 2,924 
 
3,271 2,397 
 
w 247 Mean 175 
 
182 167 
 
  
Median 175 0.000 190 167 0.000 
  
Stdev 26 
 
30 22 
 
b 246 Mean 76 
 
88 64 
 
  
Median 55 0.000 65 47 0.000 
  
Stdev 52 
 
52 49 
 
Q 183 Mean 127 
 
125 129 
 
  
Median 125 0.000 120 125 0.164 
  
Stdev 44 
 
50 48 
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Recall that the theoretical predicted outcome of the interaction is the manufacturer’s 
optimal solution that we outlined in Chapter 3. First, we would like to know if 
experimental data is in line with this solution.   
HYPOTHESIS-1 (THEORETICAL BENCHMARK, BUYBACK CONTRACT):  The 
outcome of the interaction will be as described by the manufacturer’s optimal solution. 
Specifically, w=247, b=246, Q=183 with a total profit of 23,123, where the 
manufacturer gains 22,790 and the retailer gains 333. 
Experiment data strongly rejects this hypothesis. Instead of offering the optimal 
contract which provides only a tiny profit to the retailers, the manufacturers offered 
much more acceptable contracts that yield a decent profit level to the retailers. These 
contracts had lower wholesale price, and much lower buyback prices than the 
manufacturer’s optimal solution. Retailer’s stock quantities are much lower than those 
in the optimal solution. However, they are higher than the predicted levels (i.e, the best 
response levels) given contract. Total profit level, which depends on the retailer’s stock 
quantity, is well below the one in the optimal solution. Yet, this profit is more equitably 
shared between the manufacturer and the retailer. 
Next, we study the effects of relationship length by comparing the long-run (i.e., fixed 
partner) experiments with short-run (i.e., variable partner) experiments. We expect 
higher profit levels for both firms in a long-run relationship. In these experiments, each 
partner knows that he will be playing with the other partner in all of the 30 periods. The 
partners are likely to get to know each other and learn their strategies during the 
experiment over time according to the decisions of both parties.2. The manufacturer 
should be offering more attractive contracts, and the retailer should be stocking higher 
quantities in response. In short-run relationship experiments, both partners know that 
the relationship is one shot3. Hence, we expect the partners to act more myopically, 
leading to opportunistic behavior. 
HYPOTHESIS-2 (LENGTH OF RELATIONSHIP, BUYBACK CONTRACT): Profit 
levels (retailer, manufacturer, total) will be higher under a long-run relationship than 
those under a short-run relationship.  
                                                 
2 Note that players are not allowed to communicate during experiments.  
3 Even though they may be re-matched in a future period, they will not know about it. 
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Experimental data rejects this hypothesis. We observe the retailer’s profit and total 
profit to be significantly higher in short-run relationships; whereas the manufacturer’s 
profit is significantly lower. We observe the manufacturers to offer more attractive 
contracts in terms of retailer’s predicted profit in the short-run relationships, probably 
due to the fear of rejection by the “unknown” retailer. This leads to higher stock 
quantities, which is preferable from the supply chain point of view. Another explanation 
is that the subjects engaged in destructive “strategic gaming” in the long-run 
relationships. To obtain higher profits in the long run, they may be making aggressive 
decisions (manufacturers offering unattractive contracts, and/or retailers frequently 
rejecting contracts) in the initial periods to “signal” that they are tough players.  
5.1.2. Wholesale Price Contract Experiments 
Table 5.1.3 provides descriptive statistics for the wholesale price contract experiments. 
Table 5.1.3 Comparison of Wholesale Price Contract Experiments 
Wholesale 
Price 
Contract 
Mfg. 
Optimal  
Wholesale 
All   
(m+n=180) 
p-value 
Long Run  
(w1, m=90) 
Short Run  
(w2, n=90) 
p-value 
Total Profit 17,137 Mean 19,120 
 
18,456 19,794 
 
  
Median 18,250 0.000 17,250 20,000 0.002 
  
Stdev 8,895 
 
8,857 8,617 
 
Mfg Profit 12,126 Mean 12,350 
 
12,134 12,565 
 
  
Median 12,000 0.142 11,700 12,254 0.000 
  
Stdev 4,589 
 
5,045 3,790 
 
Retailer 5,011 Mean 6,775 
 
6,322 7,229 
 
Profit 
 
Median 7,500 0.001 7,150 8,000 0.016 
  
Stdev 8,080 
 
7,691 8,455 
 
Retailer 5,011 Mean 7,517 
 
7,495 7,868 
 
Predicted 
 
Median 7,770 0.000 7,470 7,770 0.212 
Profit 
 
Stdev 2,836 
 
2,606 3,048 
 
w 176 Mean 152 
 
154 151 
 
  
Median 150 0.001 150 150 0.001 
  
Stdev 25 
 
24 26 
 
Q 96 Mean 125 
 
119 130 
 
  
Median 150 0.000 115 125 0.000 
  
Stdev 45 
 
47 39 
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First, we would like to know if experimental data is in line with the theoretical 
predicted outcome, the manufacturer’s optimal solution that we studied in Chapter 3. 
HYPOTHESIS-3 (THEORETICAL BENCHMARK, WSP CONTRACT):  The outcome of 
the interaction will be as described by the manufacturer’s optimal solution. 
Specifically, w=176, Q=96 with a total profit of 17,137 where the manufacturer gains 
12,126 and the retailer gains 5,011.  
Experiment data strongly rejects this hypothesis. The manufacturer’s profit, the 
retailer’s profit, and total profit are significantly higher than those in the manufacturer’s 
optimal solution. This counterintuitive outcome is driven by the manufacturer’s offering 
of more attractive contracts (i.e., lower w). The retailers, in turn, stocked even more 
than the theoretical best response prediction. 
The overstocking reaction of the retailers is also crucial within the scope of Schweitzer 
and Cachon (2000)’s pull-to-center effect observation. In their experiments, retailers 
overstocked for products that have high (higher than 50%) profit margin, whereas they 
understocked products that have low (lower than 50%) profit margin. This observation, 
however, conflicts with Keser and Paleologo (2004). Our experimental results can be 
seen in Chapter 6. 
Next, we study the effects of the relationship length by comparing the long-run and 
short-run relationship experiments. Again, we expect the long-run relationships to 
perform better.  
HYPOTHESIS-4 (LENGTH OF RELATIONSHIP, WSP CONTRACT): Profit levels 
(retailer, manufacturer, total) will be higher under a long-run relationship than those 
under a short run relationship.  
Similar to Hypothesis 2, experimental data rejects this hypothesis as well. We observe 
the retailer’s profit and total profit to be significantly higher in short-run relationships; 
whereas the manufacturer’s profit is lower. The manufacturers offer more (however, not 
significantly more) attractive contracts in terms of retailer’s predicted profit in the short 
run relationships, probably due to the fear of rejection by the “unknown” retailer. This 
leads to higher stock quantities, which is preferable from the supply chain point of 
view.  
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5.1.3. Comparison of the Buyback and Wholesale Price Experiments 
Here we compare the performances of the two contract types. Based on supply chain 
contracting literature, we expect the buyback contract to achieve higher total supply 
chain profit than the wholesale price contract. Also, we expect the manufacturer’s profit 
to be higher under the buyback contract. This is because the manufacturer is the one 
who offers contract parameters, and the wholesale contract is only a special case of the 
buyback contract with  = 0. 
HYPOTHESIS-5 (CONTRACT COMPARISON): (5a) Total profit and (5b) the 
manufacturer’s profit will be higher under the buyback contract than under the 
wholesale price contract.  
 
Table 5.1.4 provides descriptive statistics for the comparison.  
Table 5.1.4 Comparison of the Buyback Experiments with the Wholesale Price Contract 
Experiments 
 
Mfg.’s Optimal Solution Experiment Data 
 
Buyback 
Contract 
WSP Contract 
 
Buyback All 
(m+n=120) 
Wholesale All 
(m+n=180) 
p-value 
Total 23,123 17,137 Mean 19,010 19,125 
 
Profit 
  
Median 18,375 18,250 0.346 
   
Stdev 8,724 8,895 
 
Efficiency 99.70% 73.70% Mean 81.9% 82.40% 
 
   
Median 77.6% 78.70% 0.634 
   
Stdev 39.9% 38.30% 
 
Mfg 22,790 12,126 Mean 13,297 12,350 
 
Profit 
  
Median 12,725 12,000 0.000 
   
Stdev 5,135 4,589 
 
Retailer 333 5,011 Mean 5,714 6,775 
 
Profit 
  
Median 5,743 7,500 0.002 
   
Stdev 6,494 8,080 
 
Retailer 333 5,011 Mean 6,143 7,517 
 
Predicted 
  
Median 6,201 7,770 0.000 
Profit 
  
Stdev 2,924 2,836 
 
Q 183 96 Mean 127 125 
 
   
Median 125 150 0.091 
   
Stdev 44 45 
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Experiment data rejects Hyphothesis-5a. The total profit under the buyback contract is 
not significantly higher than that under the wholesale price contract. This finding is 
interesting because the buyback contract holds the potential to “coordinate” the supply 
chain, whereas the wholesale price contract is known to be inefficient in theory. Recall 
that in our parameter setting, the buyback contract is coordinating when Qsc=192, with 
a total supply chain profit of 23,200. The manufacturer’s optimal solution with the 
buyback contract yields a total profit of 23,123, which is quite close to the total profit 
under coordination. If the manufacturer offered his optimal buyback contract to a 
rational retailer (i.e., a computerized retailer), the outcome would be quite efficient. 
However, human retailers would probably reject a contract that offers an expected 
profit of only 333. Hence, it is understandable that this contract is not offered. However, 
the manufacturer is not offering buyback contracts that have high contract efficiency at 
all. The average efficiency of the buyback contracts in experiments is around 82%, with 
a total profit of 19,010.   
In theory, the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain unless	 =
0 = 50, which is not likely to be offered by the manufacturers. In fact, the average 
efficiency of the wholesale price contracts in our experiments is 82%, (80% in long-run 
relationships and 84% in short-run relationships). It is surprising that the average 
efficiency of the buyback and wholesale price contracts turned out to be close to each 
other.  
While Hypothesis 5a is rejected, data supports Hypothesis 5b. We observe the buyback 
contract to increase the manufacturer’s profit, while reducing the retailer’s. Actually, 
the buyback contract, with its two “levers” makes it easier for the manufacturers to 
capture profits from the retailers. This observation, combined with the discussion 
around Hypothesis 5a indicates that rather than improving supply chain efficiency, the 
buyback contract may serve as a tool to transfer retailer’s profit to manufacturer. This 
finding questions the intentions in real-life usage of the buyback contract.  
Our results contradict existing results in experimental literature. In the experiments of 
the current literature, however, only one partner is human, and the other is 
computerized. Hence, the difference in observations is probably due to the existence of 
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“strategic interaction” between two human players. Our results imply that the findings 
of one-sided experiments should be used with caution when there is strategic interaction 
between parties. Recently, other researchers have also reported experimental studies 
which find the wholesale price to perform better than theoretical prediction.  
Finally, as Table 5.1.5 illustrates, the comparisons we made between the two contract 
types are robust if one analyzes the long-run and short-run relationship experiments 
separately. 
Table 5.1.5 Comparison of Long-Run Relationship with Short-Run Relationship 
  
Long-Run Relationship Short-Run Relationship 
  
Buyback       
(b1, m=60) 
Wholesale     
(w1, n=90) 
p-value 
Buyback  
(b2, m=60) 
Wholesale         
(w2, n=90) 
p-value 
Total Mean 18,697 18,456 
 
19,323 19,794 
 
Profit Median 18,000 17,250 0.000 18,700 20,000 0.000 
 
Stdev 9,278 8,857 
 
9,228 8,617 
 
Efficiency Mean 80.60% 79.60% 
 
83.30% 85.30% 
 
 
Median 77.60% 74.40% 0.511 80.60% 86.20% 0.222 
 
Stdev 40.00% 38.20% 
 
39.80% 38.10% 
 
Mfg. Mean 13,714 12,134 
 
12,879 12,565 
 Profit Median 12,513 11,700 0.000 12,490 12,254 0.339 
 
Stdev 6,232 5,045 
 
4,989 3,790 
 
Retailer Mean 4,983 6,322 
 
6,444 7,219 
 
Profit Median 4,365 7,150 0.002 7,000 8,000 0.134 
 
Stdev 6,211 7,691 
 
6,603 8,455 
 
Retailer Mean 5,414 7,495 
 
6,872 7,868 
 
Predicted Median 4,892 7,470 0.000 7,087 7,770 0.000 
Profit Stdev 3,271 2,606 
 
2,397 3,048 
 
Q Mean 125 119 
 
129 130 
 
 
Median 120 115 0.003 125 125 0.595 
 
Stdev 50 47 
 
48 39 
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5.2. Experiment Results 
5.2.1 Experiment b1a 
Experiment b1a has six manufacturers and six retailers. Contract rejection is observed 
in three games.  
5.2.1.1 Retailer’s Stock Quantity Decision and Firms Profits 
Here, we discuss the retailer’s stock quantity decision and the firms’ profits. We 
compare experimental data with theoretical prediction (based on retailer’s newsvendor 
quantity for the given contract parameters) in each game.  
Figures 5.2.1(a)-(c) present the mean stock quantity and the firms’ profits across six 
games over 30 periods. Table 5.2.1 summarizes the comparison.  
     
 
Figure 5.2.1 (a)-(c) Stock Quantity and Firms Profits in Experiment b1a 
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Table 5.2.1 Stock Quantities and Firms Profits in Experiment b1a 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer’s Profit Manufacturer’s Profit 
 
Data Predicted p-value Data Predicted p-value Data Predicted p-value 
Mean 129 122  5,350 5,537  14,066 14,097  
Median 128 118 0.000 5,388 5,381 0.766 14,155 14,182 0.586 
St.dev. 12 5  2,523 673  1,741 300  
 
On average, we observe the retailers to overstock relative to their best response 
prediction as also seen in Figure 5.2.2. However, this over-stocking does not affect the 
retailers’ or the manufacturers’ profit significantly.  
 
Figure 5.2.2 Comparison of Q(w,b) and Q*(w,b) in Experiment b1a 
 
Next, we study the subject-level results to gain a more detailed understanding. Table 
5.2.2(a)-(c) presents the results by manufacturer-retailer pairs. We observe five out of 
six retailers to overstock, two of them significantly.  
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Table 5.2.2 (a)-(c) Stock Quantity Decisions and Firms Profits in Experiment b1a 
Stock Quantity Ret-1 Ret-2 Ret-3 Ret-4 Ret-5 Ret-6 Avr. 
Mean Data 86 134 160 119 127 142 129 
Median Data 85 135 165 105 133 143  
Predicted Q*(w,b) 106 130 164 84 109 137 122 
p-value 0.000 0.323 0.266 0.000 0.001 0.387  
 
Retailers Profit Ret-1 Ret-2 Ret-3 Ret-4 Ret-5 Ret-6 Avr. 
Mean Data 3,768 4,655 12,349 2,532 4,690 3,593 5,350 
Median Data 3,600 4,500 12,656 4,200 8,625 3,910 5,388 
Stdev 4,002 3,929 8,554 6,283 7,198 3,054  
Pred. Prof. 5,030 4,971 13,023 3,079 5,776 3,599 5,537 
p-value 0.144 0.829 0.719 0.163 0.837 0.600  
 
Mfg. Profit Mfg-1 Mfg-2 Mfg-3 Mfg-4 Mfg-5 Mfg-6 Avr. 
Mean Data 10,508 15,869 8,964 17,244 15,094 16,532 14,066 
Median Data 10,000 16,730 9,283 16,600 15,273 16,950 14,155 
Stdev 3,508 5,363 2,031 4,026 3,898 7,474  
Pred. Prof. 13,170 15,511 9,592 12,365 12,853 17,151 14,097 
p-value 0.000 0.586 0.178 0.000 0.000 0.959  
 
Retailers obtained lower profits than the predicted values on average. This is an 
expected outcome because any deviation from the newsvendor quantity reduces the 
retailer’s expected profit. The reduction; however, is not found to be significant. This is 
mainly due to the existence of the buyback term: Even when the retailer orders more 
than she should, the loss is small because unsold products are returned to the 
manufacturer at the buyback price. The manufacturer’s profit depends on the stock 
quantity of the retailer. We observe the manufacturer’s profit to be significantly higher 
than predicted when the retailer overstocked, and significantly lower than predicted 
when the retailer understocked.  
Figure 5.2.3(a)-(f) presents the stock quantities and profit levels for the six pairs 
separately over time. We observe the individual retailer behavior to be highly variable. 
Some retailers (such as retailer 3) consistently stocked high quantities, whereas some 
(such as retailer 1) stocked low. We observe how the retailer’s profit variance increases 
with his stock quantity. Setting a high stock quantity means taking risk: The retailer 
may win or lose a lot, increasing his profit variance. Retailers 4 and 5, for example, set 
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high stock quantities and ended up losing money in some games. Retailer 4 made loss 
in four games, averaging $9,219. Retailer 5 made loss in six games, averaging $7,293. 
These losses explain the difference between retailer 4 and 5’s mean and median profit 
levels. The situation with Retailer 3 is rather different. This retailer was offered very 
attractive contract parameters (as we will discuss later) ordered high quantities, and 
made high profits without much risk. Her partner, manufacturer 3, paid the price of 
offering generous contract parameters with his own profit. The total profit is 
proportional to the retailer’s stock quantity. Pairs in which the retailer stocked low 
quantities ended up making low total profits.  
   
   
   
Figure 5.2.3 (a)-(c) Stock Quantities and Profit Levels for the Six Pairs                                  
in Experiment b1a 
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The overstocking behavior of retailers is interesting. Human subjects are known to 
under-stock in newsvendor experiments under wholesale price contracts (see, Keser and 
Paleologo 2004). Perhaps, the existence of the buyback term in the contract gives a 
feeling of excessive safety to the retailers, prompting them to stock more than the best 
response.  
5.2.1.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Parameter Decisions 
Here we study the manufacturer’s contract parameter (w, b) decisions. Recall that the 
contract parameters determine the critical ratio (which determines the newsvendor 
quantity) and the retailer’s expected profit, which is a proxy for contract attractiveness. 
Figure 5.2.4 (a)-(d) illustrates the mean values of manufacturer’s contract parameters, 
implied critical ratio and retailer’s predicted profit. Table 5.2.3 summarizes the mean 
values. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.4 (a)-(d) Contract Parameters, Critical Ratio and Retailer’s Predicted Profit                       
in Experiment b1a 
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Table 5.2.3 Contract Parameters in Experiment b1a 
 
Wholesale 
Price Buyback Price Critical Ratio 
Retailer’s 
Predicted 
Profit 
Mfg. Optimal 247 246 0.75 333 
Mean Data 180 82 0.42 5,537 
Median Data 182 84 0.41 5,381 
Stdev Data 7 8 0.03 673 
 
We observe that on average, the manufacturers choose lower wholesale prices and 
much lower buyback prices than the ones in their theoretical optimal solution. 
Manufacturer-level decisions presented in Table 5.2.4 also confirm this behavior.  
 
Table 5.2.4 Manufacturer-level Decisions in Experiment b1a 
 
Mfg. Optimal Mfg-1 Mfg-2 Mfg-3 Mfg-4 Mfg-5 Mfg-6 
Wholesale Price w 247 182 193 122 202 172 209 
Buyback Price b 246 54 134 54 44 37 165 
 
Figure 5.2.5(a)-(b) below illustrates the retailer’s expected profit (i.e., contract 
attractiveness) over time for all six pairs. We observe that Manufacturer-3 offered very 
attractive contract parameters, which lead to high stock quantities and high profits for 
Retailer-3. Manufacturer-2, on the other hand, reduced the desirability of his offered 
contract over time. 
 
     
Figure 5.2.5 (a)-(b) Retailer’s Predicted Profit in Experiment b1a 
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Why did the manufacturers not offer their theoretical optimal contract, but offered 
much lower wholesale price and buyback price values that lead to higher expected 
profit to the retailer? Possible reasons include the following: 
• Making the necessary calculations: Theory assumes that the manufacturers will be 
able to make the related calculations and foresee the expected outcome for every 
contract they may offer. However, human beings are boundedly rational and they 
have limited cognitive abilities. Although the decision-support-tool on their screens 
provides assistance, the subjects may not be able to make these calculations. In 
particular, determining two contract parameters together may be a difficult task for 
the manufacturers.  
 
• Risk- and loss-averse retailers: Theory assumes that the retailer will accept any 
contract that provides her a non-negative expected profit. In addition, the theoretical 
calculations assume a risk-neutral retailer. However, human beings are risk averse 
and hence, they need to be compensated when they make decisions under risk. In 
addition, they are loss averse: They weigh losses more heavily than gains in their 
mind. Hence, a contract that provides only a small positive expected profit may not 
be accepted by the retailer. Knowing this, the manufacturer may be offering a more 
attractive contract to the retailer. 
 
• Fairness: The theoretical optimal solution provides only 1.5% of the total profit to 
the retailer, and 98.5% to the manufacturer. Human beings are known to be averse 
to “unfairness”. In particular, the retailers are not likely to accept such a contract 
that proposes a very unfair share of profits. The manufacturer himself may not also 
enjoy being “unfair” to the retailer. Hence, he offers contracts that propose a more 
equitable sharing of profits.  
 
• Fear of contract rejection: Recall that although the manufacturer enjoys the first-
mover advantage in the game, the retailer can reject the contract by ordering zero 
units, and cause both firms to gain zero profits. That is, the retailer has vetoing 
power in the game. Although we observe contract rejection only in three games out 
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of 180, the fear of rejection is likely to keep the manufacturer from offering 
unattractive contracts.   
 
• Retailer’s over-stocking bias: The manufacturer may understand the over-stocking 
bias of the retailer in the presence of the buyback term in the contract. Hence, he 
may find it sufficient to offer a relatively low buyback price in his contracts. 
5.2.1.3 Changes in Decisions over Time 
Next, we aim to understand if and how the subjects’ decisions changed over time 
perhaps, due to learning. To do so, we segment the time horizon into three to compare 
the results in the initial ten periods with the results in the last ten periods. Table 5.2.5 
presents the average-over-subjects results. The p-values of Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
are provided in the bottom row of the table.  
  
Table 5.2.5 Mean Values in Three Period Blocks in Experiment b1a 
Stock Quantity Retailer Profit Mfg. Profit 
Wholesale 
Price Buyback Price Critical Ratio 
Per. 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Pred. 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Pred. 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Pred. 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
1-10 134 130 121 5,502 5,016 6,094 14,304 14,435 13,778 174 174 73 71 0.43 0.43 
11-20 129 130 118 4,503 4,929 5,309 14,411 14,480 14,257 183 183 87 86 0.41 0.41 
21-30 125 127 117 6,046 5,992 5,209 13,484 13,710 14,256 184 183 86 86 0.41 0.41 
p-
value   0.083     0.508     0.203     0.007   0.007   0.114 
 
We observe that overall, both the wholesale price and the buyback price increased 
significantly from the first ten periods to the last ten periods. The critical ratio saw a 
decrease, albeit not significant. The attractiveness of the contracts, as indicated by the 
retailer’s predicted profit also decreased. These led to a reduction in stock quantity, 
triggering reduction in manufacturer’s profit. The retailer’s profit, on the other hand 
increased, but not significantly.  
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Next we look into the subject-level results of Table 5.2.6 to gain a deeper 
understanding. Again, we observe serious level of intra-subject variation. Hence, one 
should be careful in interpreting the average-over-retailer type results in the literature, 
including ours.  
 
Table 5.2.6 Subject-level Changes over Time in Experiment b1a 
 
Period Pair-1 Pair-2 Pair-3 Pair-4 Pair-5 Pair-6 
Q 1-10 113 145 150 119 131 130 
 
11-20 73 130 160 130 136 143 
 
21-30 70 129 170 105 129 154 
 
p-value 0.005 0.355 0.041 0.066 0.919 0.284 
Retailer 1-10 4,114 6,522 10,974 1,505 5,550 3,554 
Profit 11-20 4,343 3,312 8,491 2,072 4,579 4,221 
 
21-30 2,744 4,130 17,583 3,916 4,498 2,733 
 
p-value 0.444 0.093 0.241 0.333 0.799 0.444 
Mfg. 1-10 12,561 14,978 9,776 19,856 14,588 14,101 
Profit 11-20 9,432 15,823 8,059 18,378 15,197 19,579 
 
21-30 9,422 16,805 9,057 13,760 15,448 15,917 
 
p-value 0.086 0.445 0.444 0.093 0.859 0.721 
Retailer 1-10 6,083 7,083 12,078 2,821 6,070 3,881 
Predicted 11-20 4,796 4,010 12,646 3,174 5,996 3,504 
Profit 21-30 4,008 3,821 14,345 2,935 5,262 3,413 
 
p-value 0.011 0.005 0.007 0.799 0.028 0.799 
w 1-10 173 174 128 202 167 203 
 
11-20 184 204 127 201 171 210 
 
21-30 190 203 112 203 178 214 
 
p-value 0.019 0.008 0.007 0.813 0.014 0.117 
b 1-10 58 110 54 42 25 140 
 
11-20 56 151 63 44 39 168 
 
21-30 47 142 45 45 45 187 
 
p-value 0.033 0.035 0.015 0.44 0.005 0.014 
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Pair-1 is interesting. Manufacturer-1 decreased the attractiveness of the contract over 
time by decreasing the buyback price, and increasing the wholesale price. Retailer-1 
responded by decreasing the stock quantity, which caused both firms’ profits to 
decrease. This is an example of a lose-lose outcome. Pair-2 is similar. Pair-3, on the 
other hand, is just the opposite: The attractiveness of the contract, which was already 
good, increases even more over time. This leads to higher stock quantities and very high 
retailer profits. For this pair, it is the manufacturer who makes the sacrifice.  
Figure 5.2.6 depicts the mean (over manufacturers) contract parameters (w,b) . The 
numbers denote the periods. Note that the manufacturer’s optimal contract (w*=247, 
b*=246) is too large to be shown in this figure. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.6 Mean Contract Parameters (w,b) in Experiment b1a 
 
The changes seem to be in a larger scale in the first ten periods. In the last ten periods, 
however, the manufacturers seem to have determined their strategy. We came up with 
the idea that the subjects might stick to a certain (w,b) pair towards the end of the game 
as a result of their strategy or boredom. We wanted to understand if the manufacturers’ 
contract decisions “stabilized” towards the end of the interaction. To this end, we 
52 
 
analyzed the autocorrelations of the (w,b) decisions for the first and the last ten periods. 
If a subject stabilizes his decisions, one expects autocorrelation in the last 10 periods 
relative to the first 10 periods. As shown in Appendix H, we could not find evidence to 
support this hypothesis. 
 
5.2.1.4  Rejected Contracts 
There are only three games (out of 180) where the retailers rejected the contract by 
setting  zero stock quantity. These three contracts are shown with red circles in Figure 
5.2.7, which plots the retailer’s expected profit as a function of the contract parameters. 
We observe that the rejected contracts are among those that have high wholesale price 
and low buyback price, leading to low expected profit. Table 5.2.7 provides the details. 
We note that two of the three rejected contracts have positive predicted profit for the 
retailer, but not at high levels. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.7 Rejected and Accepted Contracts in Experiment b1a 
 
Table 5.2.7 Rejected Contracts with Predicted Results in Experiment b1a 
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Period of 
Rejection 
Retailer 
Number 
w b Q* 
Mfg's 
Predicted 
Profit 
Retailer's 
Predicted 
Profit 
27 1 200 20 81 12,104 3,013 
8 4 250 40 40 8,000 0 
7 5 180 30 100 12,767 4,892 
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5.2.2 Experiment b1b 
Experiment b1b has eight manufacturers and eight retailers. Contract rejection is 
observed in fifteen games.  
5.2.2.1 Retailer’s Stock Quantity Decision and Firms Profits 
Figures 5.2.8 (a)-(c) present the mean stock quantity and the firms’ profits across eight 
games over 30 periods. Table 10 summarizes the comparison.   
 
   
 
Figure 5.2.8 (a)-(c) Stock Quantity and Firms Profits in Experiment b1b 
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Table 5.2.8 Stock Quantities and Firms Profits in Experiment b1b 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer’s Profit Manufacturer’s Profit 
 
Data Predicted p-value Data Predicted p-value Data Predicted p-value 
Mean 121 120  4,616 5,291  13,362 14,467  
Median 122 120 0.992 3,868 5,060 0.111 13,416 14,540 0.001 
St.dev. 15 7  2,790 888  1,638 446  
 
We observe that retailers on average stocked slightly higher than the predicted 
quantities, which is consistent with Experiment b1a. However, the difference between 
data and predicted values is quite small compared to Experiment b1a. We cannot speak 
of a significant “overstocking” in this experiment. However, we observe from Figure 
5.2.8(a) that the retailers understocked in the initial periods, but overstocked in the latter 
ones.  
With these stock quantities, retailers obtained quite lower profits than predicted. 
However, the difference is not significant. Although the mean stock quantity is close to 
the mean predicted value, there exist variations in individual decisions over periods, 
which cause reduction in profit. Recall that all deviations from the predicted 
(newsvendor) quantity lead to reduction in retailer’s expected profit. We observe that 
manufacturer’s profit is lower than his predicted profit, particularly in the earlier 
periods where the retailer understocks. Unlike Experiment b1a, the ordering behavior of 
the retailer reduces the manufacturer’s profit significantly. 
5.2.2.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Parameter Decisions 
Figure 5.2.9 (a)-(d) illustrates the mean values of manufacturer’s contract parameters, 
implied critical ratio and retailer’s predicted profit. Table 5.2.9 summarizes the results. 
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Figure 5.2.9 (a)-(d) Contract Parameters, Critical Ratio and Retailer’s Predicted Profit                       
in Experiment b1b 
 
Table 5.2.9 Contract Parameters in Experiment b1b 
 
Wholesale 
Price 
(Data) 
Buyback Price 
(Data) 
Critical 
Ratio 
Retailer’s Predicted 
Profit 
Mfg. Optimal 247 246 0.75 333 
Mean 184 94 0.42 5,291 
Median 186 96 0.42 5,060 
Stdev 8 11 0.04 888 
 
We observe that the contract parameters are overall stable over time. There has been 
some fluctuation in the buyback price, leading to a fluctuation in the retailer’s predicted 
profit. On average, the manufactures choose lower wholesale prices and much lower 
buyback prices than the optimal values. This is similar to Experiment b1a. The chosen 
parameters lead to a low critical ratio, causing low stock quantities relative to the 
optimal solution. Retailer’s predicted profit comparison indicates that the manufacturers 
are offering much more attractive contracts than the ones in the optimal solution. This 
leads to a more equitable sharing of profits between the firms.   
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5.2.2.3 Changes in Decisions over Time 
Here we aim to understand if the subjects’ decisions change over periods. In Table 
5.2.10, we present the subjects’ mean decisions and profits in three period blocks 
consisting of periods 1-10, periods 11-20, and periods 21-30. To test for statistical 
significance, we compare the data of the first 10 periods with the last 10 periods.  
 
Table 5.2.10 Mean Values in Three Period Blocks in Experiment b1b 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer Profit Mfg. Profit w b 
Critical 
Ratio 
Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Data Data 
Per. 1-10 113 120 4,118 5,280 12,216 14,416 184 93 0.42 
Per. 11-20 121 118 4,922 5,021 13,888 14,547 187 96 0.41 
Per. 21-30 127 123 4,808 5,571 13,982 14,439 182 93 0.44 
p-value 0.038 
 
0.333 
 
0.028 
 
0.443 0.878 0.285 
 
We observe that the retailers understocked in the initial periods leading to quite poor 
profits. In periods 11-20, the retailers slightly overstocked. Note that the realized profit 
is close to the predicted profit. In the last periods, the retailers overstocked slightly 
more. However, because the mean predicted quantity increased, mean predicted profit 
increased to 5,571. This time, the overstocking policy fell short of reaching that profit. 
When we check the individual data, we observe that this is because of the increased 
variation in individual decisions. The overstocking strategy is consistent with 
Experiment b1a. 
We observe no significant change in wholesale price, buyback price, and the implied 
critical ratio from the first ten periods to the last ten periods. However, manufacturer’s 
profit increases significantly. This is not surprising given that the manufacturer’s profit 
depends not only on the contract parameters, but also on the retailer’s stock quantity 
decision. Although not significant, the increase in retailer’s predicted profit indicates 
that the manufacturer offers more favorable contract parameters in the last periods. This 
change and the retailer’s switch to an overstock strategy cause the retailer to order 
more, increasing the manufacturer’s profit.   
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5.2.2.4 Rejected Contracts  
Table 5.2.11 summarizes the data of the games in which the retailer rejected the 
contract. We observe that the most of the rejections are due to one single player (retailer 
2); hence, rejection is not a common retailer strategy. Given that rejections are 
concentrated in the last periods, the cause of rejections is not likely to be “strategic 
signaling”. 
 
Table 5.2.11 Rejected Contracts with Predicted Results in Experiment b1b 
Period of 
Rejection 
Retailer 
Number 
w b Q* 
Mfg's Predicted 
Profit 
Retailer's 
Predicted Profit 
1 2 225 180 108 16,673 1,840 
18 2 230 205 124 18,528 1,639 
20 2 231 198 109 17,271 1,414 
22 2 246 239 109 18,352 297 
23 2 245 235 103 17,643 357 
24 2 230 225 192 20,862 2,318 
25 2 230 225 192 20,862 2,318 
26 2 200 170 159 17,484 4,959 
26 3 220 150 97 15,192 2,045 
25 4 195 180 189 16,875 6,299 
26 4 190 189 227 14,391 8,006 
27 4 200 199 226 15,768 6,656 
29 6 200 100 103 14,433 3,567 
30 6 200 100 103 14,433 3,567 
6 7 189 80 108 14,049 4,500 
 
Retailers are more likely to reject contracts that provide low predicted profit for them, 
which is not surprising. However, all of the rejected contracts would theoretically result 
in nonnegative profit for the retailer. By rejecting such a contract, the retailer gave up 
an expected positive profit. Risk aversion may explain this behavior. Although the 
contract provides positive expected profit, losses are also possible which causes risk for 
the retailer.  
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5.2.3 Experiment b2a 
Experiment b2a has eight manufacturers and eight retailers. Contract rejection is 
observed in two games.  
5.2.3.1  Retailer’s Stock Quantity Decision and Firms Profits 
Figure 5.2.10(a)-(c) present the mean stock quantity and the firms’ profits across eight 
games over 30 periods. Table 5.2.12 summarizes the comparison.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.10 (a)-(c) Stock Quantity and Firms Profits in Experiment b2a 
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Table 5.2.12 Stock Quantities and Firms Profits in Experiment b2a 
  Stock Quantity Retailer’s Profit Manufacturer’s Profit 
  Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value 
Mean 125 123   6,736 7,071   12,667 12,944   
Median 125 122 0.173 6,271 6,869 0.289 12,924 13,072 0.196 
St.dev. 9 5   2,530 669   1,258 321   
 
We observe that retailers on average order slightly higher than the predicted average. 
However, the difference between data and predicted values are quite small. We cannot 
speak of a significant “overstocking” in this experiment. This outcome does not result 
in a significant difference between the realized profit values and the predicted for the 
manufacturer or the retailer.  
5.2.3.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Parameter Decisions  
Figure 5.2.11 (a)-(d) illustrates the mean values of manufacturer’s contract parameters, 
implied critical ratio and retailer’s predicted profit. Table 5.2.13 summarizes the 
comparison. 
 
 
  
Figure 5.2.11 (a)-(d) Contract Parameters, Critical Ratio and Retailer’s Predicted Profit                       
in Experiment b2a 
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Table 5.2.13 Contract Parameters in Experiment b2a 
 
 
Wholesale 
Price 
(Data) 
Buyback Price 
(Data) 
Critical 
Ratio 
Retailer’s Predicted 
Profit 
Mfg. Optimal 247 246 0.75 333 
Mean 163 51 0.44 7,071 
Median 165 53 0.43 6,878 
Stdev 6 7 0.02 668 
 
Similar to long run buyback experiments, the manufactures choose lower wholesale 
prices and much lower buyback prices than the ones in their theoretical optimal 
solution.  
5.2.3.3 Changes in Decisions over Time 
Here we aim to understand if the subjects’ decisions change over periods. In Table 
5.2.14, we present the subjects’ mean decisions and profits in three period blocks 
consisting of periods 1-10, periods 11-20, and periods 21-30 with p-values of the 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
 
Table 5.2.14 Mean Values in Three Period Blocks in Experiment b2a 
  
Stock Quantity Retailer Profit Mfg. Profit w b CR 
Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Data Data 
Per. 1-10 122 127 7,162 7,770 11,688 12,576 156 44 0.46 
Per. 11-20 129 124 8,070 7,020 13,432 13,084 164 55 0.44 
Per. 21-30 123 118 4,977 6,425 12,883 13,177 169 53 0.41 
p-value 0.878   0.047   0.059   0.005 0.028 0.005 
 
We observe that the manufacturers significantly increase their wholesale prices and 
their buyback price over time. However, they do not increase the buyback price as 
much as the wholesale price. Therefore, they offer less attractive contracts in the last ten 
periods as indicated in the retailer’s predicted profit values. The retailers do not respond 
to this increase and they do not decrease the stock quantity significantly. As a result, the 
retailers gain significantly lower profits in the last ten periods in comparison to the first 
ten periods.  
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5.2.3.4 Rejected Contracts  
Table 5.2.15 summarizes the data of the games in which the retailer rejected the 
contract.  
Table 5.2.15 Rejected Contracts with Predicted Results in Experiment b2a 
Period of 
Rejection 
Retailer 
Number 
w b Q* 
Mfg's Predicted 
Profit 
Retailer's 
Predicted Profit 
11 4 210 10 72 11,440 0 
3 7 200 10 80 11,895 2,970 
 
Retailer 4 rejects a contract where he would not gain positive profit whereas retailer 7 
rejects a contract with an expected profit of 2,970. Both of the rejections can be 
acceptable as 0 and 2,970 are low profit values for the retailer.  
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5.2.4 Experiment b2b 
Experiment b2b has eight manufacturers and eight retailers. Contract rejection is 
observed in thirteen games.  
5.2.4.1 Retailer’s Stock Quantity Decision and Firms Profits 
Figure 5.2.12 (a)-(c) present the mean stock quantity and the firms’ profits across eight 
games over 30 periods. Table 5.2.16 summarizes the comparison. 
   
 
   
Figure 5.2.12 (a)-(c) Stock Quantity and Firms Profits in Experiment b2b 
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Table 5.2.16 Stock Quantities and Firms Profits in Experiment b2b 
Stock Quantity Retailer’s Profit Manufacturer’s Profit 
  Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value 
Mean 132 127   6,152 6,672   13,090 13,672   
Median 139 125 0.050 6,720 6,230  0.781 12,720 13,762 0.047  
St.dev. 16 7   2,857 1,107   1,715 604   
 
We observe an overstocking behavior of the retailers on the average. The overstocking 
did not result in an increase in the manufacturer’s profit, though. The retailer’s profit 
comparison is interesting. The observed data is higher if one compares the median 
values, whereas the predicted value is higher in one compares the mean values. This 
difference is due to the existence of some very low retailer profit realizations. 
5.2.4.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Parameter Decisions 
Figures 5.2.13 (a)-(d) illustrate the mean values of manufacturer’s contract parameters, 
implied critical ratio and retailer’s predicted profit. Table 5.2.17 summarizes the 
comparison. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.13 (a)-(d) Contract Parameters, Critical Ratio and Retailer’s Predicted Profit                       
in Experiment b2b 
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Table 5.2.17 Contract Parameters in Experiment b2b 
 
Wholesale Price 
(Data) 
Buyback Price 
(Data) Critical Ratio 
Retailer’s 
Predicted 
Profit 
Mfg. Optimal 247 246 0.75 333 
Mean 170 76 0.46 6,672 
Median 173 75 0.45 6,230 
Stdev 10 12 0.04 1,107 
 
We observe that on average, the manufactures choose lower wholesale prices and much 
lower buyback prices than the ones in their theoretical optimal solution. This is a 
parallel result with the other buyback experiments. 
5.2.4.3 Changes in Decisions over Time 
Here we aim to understand if the subjects’ decisions change over periods. In Table 
5.2.18, we present the subjects’ mean decisions and profits in three period blocks 
consisting of periods 1-10, periods 11-20, and periods 21-30. To test for statistical 
significance, we compare the data of the first 10 periods with the last 10 periods.  
 
Table 5.2.18 Mean Values in Three Period Blocks in Experiment b2b 
  
Stock Quantity Retailer Profit Mfg. Profit w b CR 
Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Data Data 
Per. 1-10 130 131 6,185 7,577 12,007 13,148 162 66 0.48 
Per. 11-20 134 128 6,312 6,726 13,209 13,670 170 76 0.46 
Per. 21-30 133 122 5,958 5,713 14,054 14,197 179 85 0.43 
p-value 0.575 0.959 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.285 
 
Similar to Experiment b2a, both the wholesale price and the buyback price increase 
significantly from the first ten periods to last ten periods. This results in a decrease in 
the retailer’s predicted profit level. Although the predicted stock quantity decreases 
from the first block to the last, we observe an increase in the stock quantity (though not 
significant). The manufacturers benefit from this increase in stock quantity, and they 
gain significantly higher profits in the last ten periods. Different from Experiment b2a, 
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the retailer’s profit is higher than predicted in the last ten periods as a result of the high 
profits of one single retailer who increased the average.  
5.2.4.4 Rejected Contracts  
Table 5.2.19 summarizes the data of the games in which the retailer rejected the 
contract.  
 
Table 5.2.19 Rejected Contracts with Predicted Results in Experiment b2b 
Period of 
Rejection 
Retailer 
Number 
w b Q* 
Mfg's 
Predicted 
Profit 
Retailer's 
Predicted 
Profit 
5 6 225 140 83 13,858 1,530 
7 6 200 130 119 15,715 3,965 
8 6 190 108 120 14,994 4,791 
12 6 195 145 140 16,433 4,924 
13 6 170 20 106 12,498 5,818 
14 6 185 140 152 15,896 6,236 
18 6 225 30 62 10,740 1,259 
20 6 190 35 93 12,761 3,969 
19 4 240 150 59 11,061 491 
2 3 165 30 113 12,613 6,494 
4 3 225 125 78 13,165 1,465 
5 3 240 215 94 16,225 668 
11 1 160 15 113 12,193 6,847 
 
We observe that most 8 of the 14 rejections are due to a single retailer (retailer 6). 
Hence, contract rejection is not a widespread strategy among retailers. This retailer 
rejected contracts that offered an expected profit level as high as 6,236, which is quite 
high.  
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5.2.5. Experiment w1a 
Experiment w1a has eight manufacturers and eight retailers. Contract rejection is 
observed in five games.  
5.2.5.1 Retailer’s Stock Quantity Decision and Firms Profits 
Figures 5.2.4 (a)-(c) present the mean stock quantity and the firms’ profits across eight 
games over 30 periods. Table 5.2.20 summarizes the comparison.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.14 (a)-(c) Stock Quantity and Firms Profits in Experiment w1a 
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Table 5.2.20 Stock Quantities and Firms Profits in Experiment w1a 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer’s Profit Manufacturer’s Profit 
 
Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value 
Mean 118 113 
 
6,554 7,295 
 
12,076 11,707 
 
Median 116 111 0.032 6,796 6,977 0.309 12,046 11,843 0.861 
St.dev. 12 7 
 
3,069 995 
 
1,479 344 
 
 
Similar to buyback experiments, we observe overstocking behavior of the retailers. This 
behavior is also illustrated in Figure 5.2.15, which compares the mean experiment data 
and mean predicted value. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.15 Comparison of Q(w,b) and Q*(w,b) in Experiment w1a 
 
The profits of the retailer and the manufacturer are not significantly different from the 
predicted outcomes. But we observe a variance in the retailer’s profit. We study the 
subject-level results to gain a more detailed understanding. Table 5.2.21 (a)-(c) presents 
the results by manufacturer-retailer pairs. We observe four of the eight retailers to over-
stock significantly, whereas two of them stocked significantly less than predicted.  
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Table 5.2.21 (a)-(c) Stock Quantities and Firms Profits in Experiment w1a 
Stock 
Quantity 
Ret-1 Ret-2 Ret-3 Ret-4 Ret-5 Ret-6 Ret-7 Ret-8 Avr. 
Mean Data 123 97 85 119 96 126 142 149 118 
Median Data 123 99 80 112 100 120 140 152  
Predicted 103 100 124 124 122 105 117 110 113 
p-value 0.000 0.629 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000  
 
 
 
We observe the individual retailer behavior to be highly variable. Some retailers (such 
as retailer 1) consistently stocked high quantities, whereas some (such as retailer 3) 
stocked low. We observe how the retailer’s profit variance increases with his stock 
quantity. Retailer 6, for example, ordered significantly higher than the predicted. As she 
ordered higher than she should, the retailer’s profit is significantly lower than the 
predicted. Manufacturer 6, on the other hand, benefits from the overstocking behavior 
of the retailer and gains significantly higher.  
The following figures, Figure 5.2.16(a)-(f), we see the subject based differences more 
clearly. The outcomes highly depend on individual choices. Those figures illustrate 
once again that results based on average data need to be used with caution when 
predicting individual outcomes.  
 
Ret. Profit Ret-1 Ret-2 Ret-3 Ret-4 Ret-5 Ret-6 Ret-7 Ret-8 Avr. 
Mean Data 3,801 6,127 7,937 8,086 7,484 4,134 6,196 8,944 6,554 
Median Data 4,450 4,974 8,075 9,400 8,838 7,450 10,178 10,048  
Stdev 7,849 8,075 5,526 6,398 5,405 8,799 10,473 8,900  
Pred. Prof. 5,983 6,523 9,055 9,076 8,759 6,199 8,025 6,919 7,295 
p-value 0.136 0.441 0.021 0.926 0.766 0.004 0.008 0.033  
Mfg. Profit Mfg.-1 Mfg.-2 Mfg.-3 Mfg.-4 Mfg.-5 Mfg.-6 Mfg.-7 Mfg.-8 Avr. 
Mean Data 14,249 10,560 7,349 10,538 8,688 14,379 13,959 16,006 12,076 
Median Data 14,675 10,240 7,000 10,352 8,952 13,525 13,475 16,730  
Stdev 3,139 4,468 3,195 2,544 1,856 3,450 4,049 3,506  
Pred. Prof. 11,851 9,964 10,941 11,009 11,152 11,937 11,410 11,775 11,707 
p-value 0.000 0.787 0.000 0.262 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000  
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Figure 5.2.16 (a)-(f) Stock Quantities and Profit Levels for the Six Pairs                             
in Experiment w1a 
  
5.2.5.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Parameter Decisions 
Here we study the manufacturer’s contract parameter (w, b) decisions. Figures 5.2.17 
(a)-(c) illustrate the mean values of manufacturer’s contract parameters, implied critical 
ratio and retailer’s predicted profit. Table 5.2.22 summarizes the mean values. 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
1 4 7
1
0
1
3
1
6
1
9
2
2
2
5
2
8
S
to
ck
 Q
u
a
n
ti
ty
Periods
Stock Quantity (Ret.1-Ret.4)
Ret1 Ret2 Ret3 Ret4
0
50
100
150
200
250
1 4 7
1
0
1
3
1
6
1
9
2
2
2
5
2
8
S
to
ck
 Q
u
a
n
ti
ty
Periods
Stock Quantity (Ret.5-Ret.8)
Ret5 Ret6 Ret7 Ret8
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
1 4 7
1
0
1
3
1
6
1
9
2
2
2
5
2
8R
e
t.
 P
ro
fi
t
Periods
Ret. Profit (Ret.1-Ret.4)
Ret1 Ret2 Ret3 Ret4
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
1 4 7
1
0
1
3
1
6
1
9
2
2
2
5
2
8R
e
t.
 P
ro
fi
t
Periods
Ret. Profit (Ret.5-Ret.8)
Ret5 Ret6 Ret7 Ret8
0
10000
20000
30000
1 4 7
1
0
1
3
1
6
1
9
2
2
2
5
2
8
M
fg
. 
P
ro
fi
t
Periods
Mfg. Profit (Ret.1-Ret.4)
Mfg1 Mfg2 Mfg3 Mfg4
0
10000
20000
30000
1 4 7
1
0
1
3
1
6
1
9
2
2
2
5
2
8
M
fg
. 
P
ro
fi
t
Periods
Mfg. Profit (Ret.5-Ret.8)
Mfg5 Mfg6 Mfg7 Mfg8
71 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.17 Wholesale Price, Critical Ratio and Retailer’s Expected Profit in 
Experiment w1a 
 
Table 5.2.22 Contract Parameters in Experiment w1a 
 
Wholesale Price Critical Ratio Retailer’s 
Predicted Profit 
Mfg. Optimal 176 0.75 5,011 
Mean Data 154 0.38 7,295 
Median Data 157 0.37 6,977 
Stdev Data 9 0.03 995 
 
We observe that on average, the manufactures choose lower wholesale prices than the 
ones in their theoretical optimal solution, 176. Manufacturer-level decisions presented 
in Table 5.2.23 also confirm this behavior.  
 
Table 5.2.23 Manufacturer-level Decisions in Experiment w1a 
 
Mfg. 
Optimal 
Mfg-1 Mfg-2 Mfg-3 Mfg-4 Mfg-5 Mfg-6 Mfg-7 Mfg-8 
w 176 167 172 140 139 142 165 148 158 
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The retailer’s predicted profit that the manufacturer offers has variations throughout the 
experiment as seen in Figure 5.2.18 (a)-(b). Those figures show us the variability 
caused due to individual differences. For instance; we observe that manufacturer 2 
offers attractive contracts for the retailer at the end of first ten and last ten periods. In 
those periods, the manufacturer gains low profits. Manufacturer 6 offers unattractive 
contracts where the retailer’s predicted profit is lower.  
 
 
Figure 5.2.18 (a)-(b) Retailer’s Predicted Profit in Experiment w1a 
 
5.2.5.3 Changes in Decisions over Time 
As shown in Table 5.2.24, we do not observe a significant change in the wholesale price 
or the stock quantity over time. The critical ratio saw a decrease, albeit not significant. 
The attractiveness of the contracts, as indicated by the retailer’s predicted profit also 
decreased. These would normally lead to a reduction in stock quantity, triggering 
reduction in manufacturer’s profit as observed in Experiment b1a. However, the retailer 
increases her stock quantity despite the less attractive contract offers and this results in 
a significant decrease in her profit over time. The manufacturer benefits from the 
increasing stock quantity decisions of the retailer.  
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Table 5.2.24 Mean Values in Three Period Blocks in Experiment w1a 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer Profit Mfg. Profit Wholesale Price Critical Ratio 
Per. 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Pred. 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Pred. 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Pred. 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
1-10 113 114 116 8,120 8,796 7,853 10,794 10,695 11,492 150 152 0.4 0.39 
11-20 122 121 111 6,427 7,108 7,066 12,877 13,020 11,800 156 155 0.37 0.38 
21-30 119 114 111 5,114 5,409 6,966 12,559 12,326 11,828 157 159 0.37 0.37 
p-value 
 
0.173   
0.028 
  
0.009   
0.086 
 
0.086 
 
Next we look into the subject-level results of Table 5.2.25 to gain a deeper 
understanding. Again, we observe serious level of intra-subject variation.  
Table 5.2.25 Subject-level Changes over Time Results in Experiment w1a 
 
Period Pair-1 Pair-2 Pair-3 Pair-4 Pair-5 Pair-6 Pair-7 Pair-8 
Q 1-10 105 96 91 111 87 135 124 150 
 
11-20 136 107 70 116 97 127 151 155 
 
21-30 129 88 92 129 104 118 151 140 
 
p-value 0.072 0.442 0.233 0.240 0.202 0.169 0.123 0.445 
Retailer 1-10 4,510 7,273 9,800 7,057 6,433 6,576 10,881 12,607 
Profit 11-20 4,178 5,890 7,307 9,457 7,297 1,573 8,148 8,216 
 
21-30 2,715 5,218 6,564 7,743 8,722 4,254 -440 6,010 
 
p-value 0.241 0.721 0.674 0.878 0.386 0.285 0.047 0.285 
Mfg. 1-10 13,790 8,577 6,922 9,028 8,867 14,075 10,554 14,198 
Profit 11-20 15,948 11,286 6,657 10,993 8,558 14,967 15,207 17,239 
 
21-30 13,010 11,817 8,313 11,592 8,638 14,097 16,115 16,580 
 
p-value 0.678 0.139 0.306 0.059 0.721 0.959 0.022 0.074 
Retailer 1-10 4,347 8,532 10,302 10,060 7,303 7,127 9,375 8,443 
Predicted 11-20 5,795 6,566 8,145 8,201 9,207 5,847 7,664 6,535 
Profit 21-30 7,808 4,471 8,517 8,967 9,766 5,622 7,037 5,778 
 
p-value 0.005 0.173 0.240 0.016 0.005 0.022 0.008 0.005 
w 1-10 184 156 130 132 154 156 138 145 
 
11-20 169 166 147 147 138 168 151 161 
 
21-30 150 193 145 140 134 170 157 168 
 
p-value 0.005 0.013 0.283 0.016 0.005 0.022 0.007 0.005 
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Pair-1 is interesting. Manufacturer-1 increased the attractiveness of the contract over 
time by decreasing the wholesale price significantly. Retailer-1 responded by increasing 
the stock quantity, which caused an increase in only the manufacturer’s profit. When 
we look at the experiment data in detail, we see that this is because of the random 
demand which turned out to be very low in the last ten periods with a last period 
demand average of 102 (in comparison to an average of 156 in the first ten periods). 
Stochasticity in the demand affected the retailer’s profit negatively. In Pair-5, for 
example, the manufacturer decreased the wholesale price significantly over time, which 
led to higher stock quantity decisions from the retailer’s side. The retailer’s profit 
increased significantly consistent with what the retailer’s predicted profit suggested. In 
pair 2, the retailer orders less as a respond to increasing wholesale price. However, the 
difference is not significant and does not result in significant profit changes for the 
manufacturer or the retailer.  
Next, we analyzed the autocorrelations of the (w) decisions for the first ten periods and 
the last ten periods as summarized in Appendix I to detect whether the manufacturers 
“stabilized” their decisions towards the end of the interaction. If a subject stabilizes his 
decisions, one expects autocorrelation in the last 10 periods to be lower relative to the 
first 10 periods. As shown in Appendix I, we could not find evidence to support this 
hypothesis. This is similar to the buyback case.  
5.2.5.4 Rejected Contracts 
Table 5.2.26 presents the rejected contracts in experiment w1a. We observe from Table 
5.2.26 that all rejections are made by one single retailer (retailer 3), and the retailer’s 
expected profit is quite good for all of the rejected contracts. We could not come up 
with an explanation to why he rejected these contracts.  
Table 5.2.26 Rejected Contracts with Predicted Results in Experiment w1a 
Period of 
Rejection 
Retailer 
Number 
w Q* 
Mfg's Predicted 
Profit 
Retailer's 
Predicted Profit 
4 3 180 93 12,116 4,637 
16 3 160 108 11,924 6,649 
17 3 155 112 11,781 7,200 
18 3 160 108 11,924 6,649 
22 3 180 93 12,116 4,637 
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5.2.6 Experiment w1b 
Experiment w1b has seven manufacturers and seven retailers. Contract rejection is 
observed in nineteen games.  
5.2.6.1 Retailer’s Stock Quantity Decision and Firms Profits 
Figures 5.2.19(a)-(c) present the mean stock quantity and the firms’ profits across seven 
games over 30 periods. Table 5.2.27 summarizes the results.   
 
 
Figure 5.2.19 (a)-(c) Stock Quantity and Profits in Experiment w1b 
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Table 5.2.27 Stock Quantities and Firms Profits in Experiment w1b 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer’s Profit Manufacturer’s Profit 
 
Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value 
Mean 115 109 
 
5,705 6,743 
 
12,390 11,883 
 
Median 116 108 0.018 5,657 6,650 0.014 12,388 11,923 0.106 
St.dev. 14 4 
 
2,141 584 
 
1,584 141 
 
 
We observe the overstocking behavior in this experiment, too. The retailers gain 
significantly lower than predicted, and the manufacturers gain higher than the predicted 
profit. 
5.2.6.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Parameter Decisions 
Figure 5.2.20 (a)-(c) illustrates the mean values of manufacturer’s contract parameters, 
implied critical ratio and retailer’s predicted profit. Table 5.2.28 summarizes the 
comparison. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.20 (a)-(c) Contract Parameters, Critical Ratio and Retailer’s Predicted Profit 
in Experiment w1b 
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Table 5.2.28 Contract Parameters in Experiment w1b 
 
w 
(Data) 
Critical 
Ratio 
Retailer’s 
Predicted Profit 
Mfg. Optimal 176 0.75 5,011 
Mean 159 0.36 6,743 
Median 160 0.36 6,650 
Stdev 5 0.02 584 
 
5.2.6.3 Changes in Decisions over Time 
Here we aim to understand if the subjects’ decisions change over periods. In Table 
5.2.29, we test for statistical significance, and we compare the data of the first 10 
periods with the last 10 periods.  
 
Table 5.2.29 Mean Values in Three Period Blocks in Experiment w1b 
  
Stock Quantity Retailer Profit Mfg. Profit w CR 
Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Data 
Per. 1-10 114 107 4,431 6,518 12,674 11,939 161 0.35 
Per. 11-20 115 108 5,837 6,552 12,260 11,927 161 0.36 
Per. 21-30 117 112 6,846 7,160 12,236 11,785 155 0.38 
p-value 0.575   0.022   0.646   0.015 0.015 
 
We observe that the wholesale price decreases significantly over time and therefore the 
critical ratio increases at the same level of significance. The manufacturers offer better 
contracts to the retailers over time. Therefore, the retailers gain significantly higher 
profits even though the increase in the stock quantity over time is not significant. 
5.2.6.4 Rejected Contracts 
We observe that almost all of the rejections (15 out of 19) are due to one single player 
(retailer 3); hence, rejection is not a common retailer strategy. As retailer 3 starts 
rejecting from the first period, retailer 3 is probably “signaling” to the manufacturer that 
he is a tough player who will not accept low profits, as she has a fixed partner 
throughout the experiment. However, all of the rejected contracts would theoretically 
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result in nonnegative profit for the retailer as seen in Table 5.2.30. By rejecting such a 
contract, the retailer gave up an expected positive profit. Risk aversion may explain this 
behavior. Although the contract provides positive expected profit, losses are also 
possible which causes risk for the retailer.  
 
Table 5.2.30 Rejected Contracts with Predicted Results in Experiment w1b 
Period of 
Rejection 
Retailer 
Number 
w Q* 
Mfg's Predicted 
Profit 
Retailer's 
Predicted Profit 
1 3 175 97 12,125 5,111 
2 3 170 101 12,096 5,605 
3 3 160 108 11,924 6,649 
4 3 160 108 11,924 6,649 
8 3 150 116 11,600 7,770 
9 3 150 116 11,600 7,770 
10 3 150 116 11,600 7,770 
11 3 151 115 11,639 7,655 
12 3 151 115 11,639 7,655 
13 3 151 115 11,639 7,655 
14 3 151 115 11,639 7,655 
15 3 151 115 11,639 7,655 
16 3 150 116 11,600 7,770 
17 3 151 115 11,639 7,655 
18 3 150 116 11,600 7,770 
12 5 168 102 12,074 5,808 
24 5 160 108 11,924 6,649 
25 5 145 120 11,381 8,359 
26 5 150 116 11,600 7,770 
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5.2.7 Experiment w1c 
Experiment w1c has eight manufacturers and eight retailers. Contract rejection is seen 
in thirteen games.  
5.2.7.1 Retailer’s Stock Quantity Decision and Firms Profits 
Figure 5.2.21 (a)-(c) present the mean stock quantity and the firms’ profits across eight 
games over 30 periods. Table 5.2.31 summarizes the results.   
 
 
Figure 5.2.21 (a)-(c) Stock Quantity and Firms Profits in Experiment w1c 
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Table 5.2.31 Stock Quantities and Firms Profits in Experiment w1c 
  Stock Quantity Retailer’s Profit Manufacturer’s Profit 
  Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value 
Mean 123 116 
 
6,707 7,855 
 
11,935 11,534 
 
Median 120 115 0.012 7,579 7,597 0.106 11,709 11,658 0.254 
St.dev. 15 6 
 
2,794 921 
 
1,259 346 
 
 
Similar to the experiments until now, we observe a significant overstocking behavior of 
the retailer. The profits are not affected significantly. 
5.2.7.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Parameter Decisions 
Figure 5.2.22 (a)-(c) illustrates the mean values of manufacturer’s contract parameters, 
implied critical ratio and retailer’s predicted profit. Table 5.2.32 summarizes the 
comparison. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.22 Wholesale Price, Critical Ratio, and Retailer’s Predicted Profit                        
in Experiment w1c 
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Table 5.2.32 Contract Parameters in Experiment w1c 
 
w 
Critical Ratio Retailer’s Pred. 
Profit (Data) 
Mfg. Optimal 176 0.75 5,011 
Mean 149 0.40 7,855 
Median 152 0.39 7,597 
Stdev 8 0.03 921 
5.2.7.3 Changes in Decisions over Time 
In Table 5.2.33, we present the subjects’ mean decisions and profits in three period 
blocks and we compare the data of the first 10 periods with the last 10 periods.  
Table 5.2.33 Mean Values in Three Period Blocks in Experiment w1c 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer Profit Mfg. Profit w CR 
Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Data 
Per. 1-10 123 113 5,040 7,374 12,665 11,702 154 0.39 
Per. 11-20 115 115 7,290 7,595 11,350 11,643 152 0.39 
Per. 21-30 131 121 7,790 8,594 11,791 11,256 143 0.43 
p-value 0.385 
 
0.005 
 
0.241 
 
0.009 0.009 
 
We observe that the wholesale price decreases significantly and the retailer gains 
significantly higher profits in the last ten periods although the increase in the stock 
quantity is not significant. This is similar to what we observed in Experiment w1b.  
5.2.7.4 Rejected Contracts 
All of the rejected contracts would theoretically result in nonnegative profit for the 
retailer as seen in Table 5.2.34. By rejecting such a contract, the retailer gave up an 
expected positive profit. But at the same time, she tried to signal her behavior. For 
instance, retailer 2 signals aggressively that she would not accept the w=190 by using 
her “veto” option consecutively.     
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Table 5.2.34 Rejected Contracts with Predicted Results in Experiment w1c 
Period of 
Rejection 
Retailer 
Number 
w Q* 
Mfg's Predicted 
Profit 
Retailer's 
Predicted Profit 
2 2 190 86 11,984 3,745 
3 2 190 86 11,984 3,745 
10 2 170 101 12,096 5,605 
18 2 160 108 11,924 6,649 
19 2 175 97 12,125 5,111 
20 2 175 97 12,125 5,111 
1 3 165 105 12,029 6,117 
2 3 150 116 11,600 7,770 
10 3 140 124 11,124 8,967 
21 3 137 126 10,952 9,341 
26 3 130 131 10,496 10,241 
21 5 168 102 12,074 5,808 
29 7 210 70 11,264 2,191 
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In the following experiments, namely experiments w2a, w2b, and w2c, the partners are 
re-determined in each period.  
5.2.8 Experiment w2a 
Experiment w2a has seven manufacturers and seven retailers. Contract rejection (i.e., 
setting zero stock quantity) is observed in six games.  
5.2.8.1 Retailer’s Stock Quantity Decision and Firms Profits 
Figures 5.2.23(a)-(c) present the mean stock quantity and the firms’ profits across seven 
games over 30 periods. Table 5.2.35 summarizes the comparison.   
 
 
Figure 5.2.23 (a)-(c) Stock Quantity and Firms Profits in Experiment w2a                                                                          
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Table 5.2.35 Stock Quantities and Firms Profits in Experiment w2a 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer’s Profit Manufacturer’s Profit 
 
Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value 
Mean 128 117 
 
7,540 7,966 
 
12,017 11,465 
 
Median 127 115 0.000 6,601 7,655 0.219 12,071 11,639 0.329 
St.dev. 11 8 
 
3,453 1,302 
 
1,131 608 
 
w2 experiments have pairs which are re-determined every period. However, this 
structural change does not seem to affect the overstocking behavior of the retailer. As a 
result, the retailer gains significantly lower profits than predicted. From Figure 
5.2.23(b), we observe that the manufacturers offer less attractive contracts over time, 
leading to reductions in the retailer’s profit and increases in their own profits. This is 
different from what is observed in other experiments. This is due to the behavior of two 
of the manufacturers, who increase the wholesale price. We will be able to detect the 
effect of this behavior on the average in the following section. 
5.2.8.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Parameter Decisions 
Figure 5.2.24 (a)-(c) illustrates the mean values of manufacturer’s contract parameters, 
implied critical ratio and retailer’s predicted profit. Table 5.2.36 summarizes the 
comparison. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.24 Wholesale Price, Critical Ratio, and Retailer’s Predicted Profit over Time 
in Experiment w2a 
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Table 5.2.36 Contract Parameters in Experiment w2a 
 
w 
Critical Ratio Retailer’s Pred. 
Profit (Data) 
Mfg. Optimal 176 0.75 5,011 
Mean  149 0.41 7,966 
Median 151 0.40 7,655 
Stdev 10 0.04 1,302 
 
We observe that the wholesale price and the critical ratio lie under the manufacturer’s 
optimal as in other experiments. 
5.2.8.3 Changes in Decisions over Time 
Here we aim to understand if the subjects’ decisions change over periods. In Table 
5.2.37, we present the subjects’ mean decisions and profits in three period blocks 
consisting of periods 1-10, periods 11-20, and periods 21-30. To test for statistical 
significance, we compare the data of the first 10 periods with the last 10 periods.  
 
Table 5.2.37 Mean Values in Three Period Blocks in Experiment w2a 
  
Stock Quantity Retailer Profit Mfg. Profit w 
Critical 
Ratio 
Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Data 
Per. 1-10 136 123 9,429 9,009 11,625 11,002 140 0.44 
Per. 11-20 125 116 7,493 7,716 11,945 11,612 151 0.40 
Per. 21-30 124 112 5,699 7,172 12,480 11,780 155 0.38 
p-value 0.05 
 
0.028 
 
0.074 
 
0.015 0.015 
 
We observe the manufacturers to increase the wholesale price over time. This causes 
the retailer’s predicted profit to reduce as well. However, the retailer’s realized profit 
reduced even more sharply from the first ten periods to the last ten periods. This is due 
to the overstocking behavior of the retailers. Manufacturer’s profit, on the other hand, 
increased over time and is higher than its predicted values thanks to the retailer’s 
overstocking behavior.  
86 
 
5.2.8.4 Rejected Contracts 
Table 5.2.38 presents the data of the games with rejected contracts. We observe that all 
of the six rejections are due to one single player (retailer 4); hence, rejection is not a 
common retailer strategy. This retailer rejected contracts that offered expected profits as 
high as 6,649. 
 
Table 5.2.38  Rejected Contracts with Predicted Results in Experiment w2a 
Period of 
Rejection 
Retailer 
Number 
w Q* 
Mfg.'s Predicted 
Profit 
Retailer's 
Predicted Profit 
3 4 160 108 11,924 6,649 
4 4 200 78 11,700 2,930 
8 4 180 93 12,116 4,637 
11 4 179 94 12,121 4,730 
13 4 168 102 12,074 5,808 
22 4 189 86 12,004 3,831 
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5.2.9 Experiment w2b 
Experiment w2b has seven manufacturers and seven retailers. This is the only 
experiment where we do not have any games with contract rejection. 
5.2.9.1 Retailer’s Stock Quantity Decision and Firms Profits 
Figure 5.2.25(a)-(c) presents the mean stock quantity and the firms’ profits across seven 
games over 30 periods. Table 5.2.26 summarizes the comparison.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.25 (a)-(c) Stock Quantity and Firms Profits in Experiment w2b 
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Table 5.2.39 Stock Quantities and Firms Profits in Experiment w2b 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer’s Profit Manufacturer’s Profit 
 
Data Predicted p-value Data Predicted p-value Data Predicted p-value 
Mean 139 119 
 
7,003 8,202 
 
13,120 11,433 
 
Median 138 119 0.000 7,128 8,181 0.047 13,218 11,451 0.000 
St.dev. 10 3 
 
3,123 465 
 
787 179 
 
 
We continue to observe overstocking of the retailer in this experiment. The retailers 
gain significantly lower than predicted, whereas the manufacturers benefit from the 
deviation of the retailers from the newsvendor quantity. 
5.2.9.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Parameter Decisions 
Figure 11 (a)-(c) illustrates the mean values of manufacturer’s contract parameters, 
implied critical ratio and retailer’s predicted profit. Table 11 summarizes the 
comparison. 
 
   
Figure 5.2.26 (a)-(c) Contract Parameters, Critical Ratio and Retailer’s Expected Profit                                                       
in Experiment w2b 
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Table 5.2.40 Contract Parameters in Experiment w2b 
 
w 
Critical Ratio Retailer’s Pred. 
Profit (Data) 
Mfg. Optimal 176 0.75 5,011 
Mean 146 0.41 8,202 
Median 147 0.41 8,181 
Stdev 4 0.02 465 
 
5.2.9.3 Changes in Decisions over Time 
Next, we present the subjects’ mean decisions and profits in three period blocks 
consisting of periods 1-10, periods 11-20, and periods 21-30. To test for statistical 
significance, we compare the data of the first 10 periods with the last 10 periods as 
shown in Table 5.2.41.  
 
Table 5.2.41 Mean Values in Three Period Blocks in Experiment w2b 
  
Stock Quantity Retailer Profit Mfg. Profit w CR 
Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Pred Data Data 
Per. 1-10 137 119 7,767 8,173 12,894 11,447 147 0.41 
Per. 11-20 137 118 5,888 8,064 13,063 11,492 148 0.41 
Per. 21-30 144 120 7,354 8,369 13,402 11,361 145 0.42 
p-value 0.169 
 
0.878 
 
0.114 
 
0.590 0.590 
 
Different from other experiments, we cannot detect a significant change between the 
first ten periods and the last ten periods. 
5.2.9.4 Rejected Contracts 
There were no games with contract rejection in this experiment.  
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5.2.10 Experiment w2c 
Experiment w2c has seven manufacturers and seven retailers. Contract rejection is seen 
in six games.  
5.2.10.1 Retailer’s Stock Quantity Decision and Firms Profits 
Figure 5.2.28 (a)-(c) presents the mean stock quantity and the firms’ profits across 
seven games over 30 periods. Table 5.2.42 summarizes the results.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.27 Stock Quantity and Firms Profits in Experiment w2c 
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Table 5.2.42 Stock Quantities and Firms Profits in Experiment w2c 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer’s Profit Manufacturer’s Profit 
 
Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value Data Pred. p-value 
Mean 123 111 
 
7,114 7,005 
 
12,559 11,776 
 
Median 122 111 0.000 7,959 6,978 0.719 12,384 11,842 0.057 
St.dev. 11 7 
 
3,110 1,104 
 
1,507 362 
 
 
The retailers, on average, order significantly higher than predicted. Different from other 
experiments, both the retailer and the manufacturer on average achieved higher profits 
than predicted. However, this is a result of only one particular player. This retailer gains 
very high profits in comparison to others (especially during the last periods). Therefore, 
the data of the retailer’s profit becomes higher than the predicted on the average. Due to 
the same retailer, the difference between median of data and the predicted is also larger 
than the difference between mean of the data and the predicted. This case is another 
good example of the effects that one single retailer might cause and affect the 
experiment average.   
5.2.10.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Parameter Decisions 
Figures 5.2.29 (a)-(c) illustrate the mean values of manufacturer’s contract parameters, 
implied critical ratio and retailer’s predicted profit. Table 5.2.43 summarizes the results. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.28 (a)-(c) Contract Parameters, Critical Ratio and Retailer’s Predicted Profit                                                      
in Experiment w2c 
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Table 5.2.43 Contract Parameters in Experiment w2c 
 
w 
Critical Ratio Retailer’s Pred. 
Profit (Data) 
Mfg. Optimal 176 0.75 5,011 
Mean 157 0.37 7,005 
Median 157 0.37 6,978 
Stdev 10 0.04 1,104 
5.2.10.3 Changes in Decisions over Time 
In Table 5.2.44, we present the subjects’ mean decisions and profits in three period 
blocks where we test for statistical significance by comparing the data of the first 10 
periods with the last 10 periods.  
 
Table 5.2.44 Mean Values in Three Period Blocks in Experiment w2c 
  
Stock Quantity Retailer Profit Mfg. Profit w 
Critical 
Ratio 
Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Data 
Per. 1-10 116 113 7,833 7,431 11,244 11,627 153 0.39 
Per. 11-20 129 113 6,219 7,261 12,778 11,735 155 0.38 
Per. 21-30 124 106 7,291 6,322 13,655 11,965 163 0.35 
p-value 0.126 
 
0.575 
 
0.009 
 
0.021 0.021 
 
The manufacturers increase the wholesale price significantly from the first ten periods 
to the last ten periods. However, we observe that the retailers do not respond to this 
increase with a significant decrease in the stock quantity. Instead, they increase their 
stock quantity. The manufacturer benefits from this behavior and gains significantly 
higher profits than predicted in the last ten periods. Due to the retailer who gained 
higher profits in comparison to others, the retailer’s profit average in the last ten periods 
is higher than the predicted value. If that retailer did not participate in the experiment, 
the retailer’s profit on the average would be much lower than the predicted average.  
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5.2.10.4 Rejected Contracts  
Table 5.2.45 summarizes the data for games with rejected contracts. We observe that 
the rejected contracts usually have low expected profits for the retailer. 
 
Table 5.2.45 Rejected Contracts with Predicted Results in Experiment w2c 
Period of 
Rejection 
Retailer 
Number 
w Q* 
Mfg.'s Predicted 
Profit 
Retailer's 
Predicted Profit 
21 1 214 67 11,047 1,917 
24 1 190 86 11,984 3,745 
4 2 229 56 10,017 998 
16 2 231 54 9,854 889 
7 5 249 41 8,111 40 
20 6 250 40 8,000 0 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6. DECISION HEURISTICS 
In this chapter, we would like to understand whether the subjects followed “decision 
heuristics” in making their decisions. We conducted the analysis on the two 
experiments that we explained in detail in Chapter 5, namely Experiment b1a and 
Experiment w1a.  
6.1. Experiment b1a 
6.1.1 Linear Regression 
In our study, the periods of a given experiment are independent of each other. That is, 
the outcome of a period is not affected directly from the decisions or results in a 
previous period. However, we suspect that a subject’s decision in a given period might 
be affected by the outcome of previous periods due to behavioral reasons. For example, 
a subject who had a large amount of leftovers on hand at the end of a period might 
make a more cautious decision in the next period in order not to face the same problem, 
even though there is no relevance.  
Here, we use regression analysis to obtain clues about the underlying behavioral factors 
that affect subjects’ decisions. We conducted the regression analysis using SPSS, with 
the “backward” variable selection method and with standardized coefficients. The 
analysis is conducted at two different levels: Experiment-based (where all subjects’ data 
in an experiment is pooled) and subject-based (to investigate subject-based decisions). 
For all of the variables stated in the regression result tables, the VIF statistic is desired 
to be less than 10 to avoid multi-collinearity. 
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6.1.1.1 Regression for the Stock Quantity Decision of the Retailer 
Here, we analyze retailer subjects’ stock level decisions. First, we control whether there 
is a significant relationship between the stock level decision and other variables. We 
control the relationship with multiple and simple regression analysis for the experiment 
and each subject. Similar to our other analyses, we discarded the data of games where 
the retailer rejected the contract by setting zero stock quantity. Doing otherwise would 
cause issues with linear regression. 
We conducted regression analysis to regress the response variable, “the retailer’s stock 
level decision at period t”. The predictor variables and their abbreviations used in the 
regression are shown in Table 6.1.1. 
 
Table 6.1.1 The Predictor Variables and Their Abbreviations for Retailer’s Stock 
Quantity Decision 
Predictor variables Abbreviations 
Wholesale price at period t or t-1 w(t) or w(t-1) 
Buyback price at period t or t-1 b(t) or b(t-1) 
Demand realization at period t-1 D(t-1) 
Retailer’s profit at period t-1 rp (t-1) 
Overage at period t-1 O(t-1) 
Underage at period t-1 U(t-1) 
 
In addition to stated predictor variables, we also considered the effect of manufacturer’s 
profit at period (t-1). However, the analysis that included this variable did not result in 
significant regression equations.  
6.1.1.2 Experiment-Based Regression 
We tested the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between retailer’s stock 
quantity decision and the variables stated in Table 6.1.1. Results are shown in Table 
6.1.2. If the stock quantity decision is expressed by an equation of at least one predictor 
variable significantly (i.e., if the regression model passed the F test and p-value ≤ 0.1), 
the “response” for that experiment is defined as “yes”. “Response variables” show 
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which predictor variables are in the regression model. We also provide R², the adjusted 
R² and F-test p-values. “Equation” shows the regression model of the significant 
analysis, where p-value is less than 0.1. Absolute regression coefficient (absolute beta 
values) of each predictor variable in an equation indicates the power of that variable in 
predicting the stock quantity decision.  
We observe that 38.3% of the variability in the stock quantity of a retailer can be 
explained by w(t), b(t), D(t-1), O(t-1), U(t-1) on the average. The high absolute beta 
values indicate that the most effective variables are the wholesale price at period t and 
demand at period (t-1). 
 
Table 6.1.2 Experiment-Based Multiple Linear Regression Results in Experiment b1a 
for the Retailer 
Response Predictor 
variables R
2 Adj. 
R2 
p-
value Equation 
yes w(t) and b(t) 0.319 0.311 0.000 
Q(t) = 232.722 - 0.775*w(t) + 
0.419*b(t) 
yes w(t) and D(t-1) 0.127 0.117 0.000 
Q(t) = 191.222 - 0.444*w(t) + 
0.117*D(t-1) 
yes w(t), b(t), and 
D(t-1) 0.34 0.328 0.000 
Q(t) = 220.964 - 0.791*w(t) + 
0.416*b(t) + 0.110*D(t-1) 
yes D(t-1), O(t-1) 0.091 0.081 0.000 Q(t) = 77.284 + 0.290*D(t-1) + 
0.410*O(t-1) 
yes w(t), D(t-1), 
O(t-1) 0.178 0.164 0.000 
Q(t) = 152.294 - 0.396*w(t) + 
0.278*D(t-1) + 0.340*O(t-1) 
yes 
w(t), b(t), D(t-
1), O(t-1),     
U(t-1) 
0.401 0.383 0.000 
Q(t) = 166.186 - 0.621*w(t) + 
0.329*b(t) + 0.389*D(t-1) + 
0.200*O(t-1) - 0.340*U(t-1) 
yes D(t-1), O(t-1), 
U(t-1) 0.24 0.226 0.000 
Q(t) = 56.304 + 0.587*D(t-1) + 
0.393*O(t-1) - 0.554*U(t-1) 
yes Ret. profit(t-1), 
w(t) and b(t) 0.337 0.325 0.000 
Q(t) = 210.541 - 0.671*w(t) + 
0.400*b(t) + 0.001*rp(t-1) 
yes Ret. profit(t-1) 
and D(t-1) 0.163 0.102 0.000 
Q(t) = 125.145 - 0.083*D(t-1) + 
0.002*rp(t-1) 
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Next, in Table 6.1.3 we provide the results for the simple linear regression studies we 
conducted for each predictor variable separately.  
Table 6.1.3 Experiment-Based Single Linear Regression Results in Experiment b1a    
for the Retailer 
Response Predictor variables R2 Adj. 
R2 
p-
value Equation 
yes wholesale price(t) 0.091 0.091 0.000 
Q(t) = 195.87 -
0.3711*w(t) 
yes buyback price(t) 0.044 0.043 0.001 Q(t) = 116.42 + 
0.1518*w(t) 
no demand(t-1) 
    
yes wholesale price(t) - 
buyback price(t) 0.169 0.164 0.000 
Q(t) = 162.7 - 
0.3412*[w(t)-b(t)] 
yes retailer profit (t-1) 0.117 0.110 0.000 
Q(t) = 118.570 - 
0.002*rp(t-1) 
no overage(t-1) 
    
yes underage(t-1) 0.054 0.052 0.010 Q(t) = 140.86 - 
0.2363*U(t-1) 
 
Simple linear regression of Experiment b1a does not result in high adjusted R2 values. 
However, we can state that wholesale price of the current period (period t) and the 
difference between the wholesale price and buyback price in the previous period (period 
t-1) are strong variables, as their high absolute beta values suggest. 
6.1.1.3 Subject-Based Regression 
Here we analyze the stock quantity decision of the retailer in period t by subject-based 
regression. The results are provided in Table 6.1.4. 
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Table 6.1.4 Subject-Based Multiple Linear Regression Results in Experiment b1a 
Sub. Predictor 
variables R
2 Adj. 
R2 
p-
value Equation 
Ret-1 w(t), b(t),    
D(t-1), O(t-1) 0.799 0.639 0.054 
Q(t)=19.608-
0.353*w(t)+2.076*b(t) 
+0.119*D(t-1)+0.462*O(t-1) 
Ret-2 w(t), b(t),  
D(t-1), U(t-1) 0.564 0.418 0.030 
Q(t)=508.519-
2.724*w(t)+1.146*b(t)-0.067* 
D(t-1)+0.329*U(t-1) 
Ret-3 w(t), b(t),  
D(t-1), U(t-1) 0.933 0.865 0.013 
Q(t)=279.218-
2.043*w(t)+1.537*b(t)+0.248* 
D(t-1)-0.035*U(t-1) 
Ret-4 w(t), b(t),  
O(t-1) 0.852 0.740 0.039 
Q(t)=330.838-
1.946*w(t)+3.704*b(t) 
+0.090*O(t-1) 
Ret-5 w(t), b(t),  
D(t-1), O(t-1) 0.760 0.654 0.007 
Q(t)= 811.135-
4.542*w(t)+2.430*b(t) + 
0.036*D(t-1)-0.028*O(t-1) 
Ret-6 w(t), b(t),   D(t-
1), O(t-1) 0.740 0.625 0.010 
Q(t)=315.483-
1.228*w(t)+1.125*b(t) -1.078* 
D(t-1)-0.258*O(t-1) 
 
The results are subject-dependent. Yet, not surprisingly, we observe the contract 
parameters w(t) and b(t) to affect all retailers’ quantity decisions consistently.  In 
addition, demand, overage and underage values in period (t-1) are the other variables 
that explain the differences in the retailers’ stock quantity choices. Subject-level 
regression analysis seems promising: The models are highly significant (i.e., the p-
values are less than 0.1) for all retailers and the R² values are greater than 0.60 for five 
out of six retailers.  
6.1.1.4 Regression for the Wholesale Price Decision of the Manufacturer 
Here we focus on the manufacturers’ wholesale price decision. First, we control 
whether there is a significant relationship between the wholesale price decision and 
other variables. We control the relationship with multiple and simple regression 
analysis for each experiment and each subject. The variables that we used for linear 
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regression analysis of the manufacturers’ decision are shown in Table 6.1.5 with their 
abbreviations. 
Table 6.1.5 The Predictor Variables and Their Abbreviations for the Manufacturer 
Predictor variables Abbreviations 
Wholesale price at period t-1 w(t-1) 
Buyback price at period t-1 b(t-1) 
Demand realization at period t-1 D(t-1) 
Retailer’s stock quantity at period t-1 Q(t-1) 
Manufacturer’s profit at period t-1 mp(t-1) 
 
In addition, we tried to explain the buyback price decision of the manufacturer through 
linear regression. However, we could not find a significant relation with the candidate 
predictor variables. We also studied whether there is a significant relationship between 
each manufacturer’s (w,b) decision at a period with his decisions at previous periods. 
To this end, we conducted an autocorrelation analysis both for the wholesale price and 
the buyback price with three lags. This study is presented at Chapter 5, whereas the 
autocorrelation tables can be found in Appendix H.  
6.1.1.5 Experiment-Based Decisions 
We tested the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between manufacturer’s 
wholesale price decision with the multiple predictor variables stated in Table 6.1.6. The 
following analysis is conducted by pooling all experiment b1a data. We regressed 180 
decisions of the six manufacturers. 
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Table 6.1.6 Experiment-Based Multiple Linear Regression Results in Experiment b1a 
for the Manufacturer’s Decision 
Response Predictor 
variables R
2 Adj. R2 p-
value Equation 
yes w(t-1) and b(t-1) 0.778 0.775 0.000 
w(t) = 24.422 + 0.85 *  w(t-
1) + 0.037*b(t-1) 
yes Q(t-1) and D(t-1) 0.078 0.067 0.000 
w(t) = 200.213 - 0.204* Q(t-
1) + 0.048*D(t-1) 
 
We observe that 77.5% of the variability in the wholesale price of a manufacturer can 
be explained by w(t-1), and b(t-1). As a second set of candidate predictor variables, we 
note that Q(t-1) and D(t-1) can only explain 6.7% of the variability.  
Next, in Table 6.1.7.we provide the results for the simple linear regression studies we 
conducted for each predictor variable separately.  
 
Table 6.1.7 Experiment-Based Simple Linear Regression Results in Experiment b1a    
for the Manufacturer’s Decision 
Response Predictor variables R2 Adj. 
R2 
p-
value Equation 
no w(t-1) - b(t-1) 
    
yes Q(t-1) 0.071 0.066 0.000 w(t) = 207.025 - 0.207*Q(t-1) 
no D(t-1) 
    
yes Mfg. profit(t-1) 0.187 0.182 0.000 w(t) = 147.583 + 0.002*mp(t-1) 
 
Even though the adjusted-R2 values are not high, stock quantity in period (t-1) and the 
manufacturer’s own profit in period (t-1) yield significant linear regression models. 
6.1.1.6 Subject-Based Decisions 
Next, we analyze the manufacturer’s wholesale price decision by subject. Table 6.1.8 
shows the regression results for w(t). 
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Table 6.1.8 Subject-Based Simple Linear Regression Results in Experiment b1a                   
for the Manufacturer’s Decision 
 
Subject Predictor variables R2 Adj. 
R2 
p-
value Equation 
Mfg-1 w(t-1) - b(t-1) 0.125 0.092 0.065 w(t)=154.998 + 0.215*[w(t)-b(t)] 
Mfg-2 w(t-1), b(t-1), Q(t-1) 
and D(t-1) 0.765 0.726 0.000 
w(t)=102.423 - 0.15*Q(t-1) + 
0.034*D(t-1) + 0.328*w(t-1) + 
0.331*b(t-1) 
Mfg-3 w(t-1) and b(t-1) 0.759 0.740 0.000 
w(t)=3.158+0.935*w(t-1) + 
0.077*b(t-1) 
Mfg-4 D(t-1), w(t-1) and 
b(t-1) 0.459 0.391 0.002 
w(t)=259.552-0.442*w(t-1) + 
0.582*b(t-1)+0.043*D(t-1) 
Mfg-5 Q(t-1), w(t-1) and 
b(t-1) 0.648 0.604 0.000 
w(t)=42.160+0.041*Q(t-1) 
+0.711*w(t-1)+0.079*b(t-1) 
Mfg-6 w(t-1) - b(t-1) 0.164 0.133 0.029 
w(t)=219.285-0.224 * [w(t-1) - 
b(t-1)] 
 
The results are subject-dependent. Yet, we observe the contract parameters in the 
previous period w(t-1) and b(t-1) to affect all manufacturers’ contract parameter 
decisions consistently.  In addition, demand and stock quantity in period (t-1) are the 
other variables that explain the differences in the decisions. Subject-level regression 
analysis seems promising: The models are highly significant (i.e., the p-values are less 
than 0.06) for all manufacturers and the R² values are greater than 0.60 for three out of 
six manufacturers.  
6.1.2 Orders Related to Previous Waste  
Keser and Paleologo (2004) mention two hypotheses from the literature on the possible 
behaviors of the retailers depending on the leftovers units. According to the availability 
hypothesis (Tverysky and Kahneman, 1974), unsatisfied demand results in an increase 
in the stock quantity Q in the following period, and overstock results in a decrease in 
the stock quantity in the following period. In Experiment b1a, we found two retailers 
that behave as predicted by the availability hypothesis (Binomial test, p=0.05). The 
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other hypothesis, gambler’s fallacy (Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989) makes the 
opposite prediction. This is because retailer thinks that a specific event is not likely to 
occur again in the next period. In Experiment b1a, we found only one retailer to behave 
as predicted by the gambler’s fallacy hypothesis (Binomial test, p=0.05). 
6.1.3 Pull-to-Center Effect 
As mentioned in the Literature Review, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) came up with an 
important observation called the pull-to-center effect. In their newsvendor experiments, 
retailers overstocked for products that have high (higher than 50%) profit margin, 
whereas they understocked products that have low (lower than 50%) profit margin. We 
conducted retailer and game-based analysis to see if pull-to-center effect exists in our 
Experiment b1a. Only one out of six retailers in this experiment acted according to pull-
to-center effect in the majority of the periods (22 out of 30 periods). Therefore, we 
cannot find evidence for this effect in Experiment b1a. 
 
  
103 
 
6.2. Experiment w1a 
6.2.1 Linear Regression 
6.2.1.1 Linear Regression for the Stock Quantity Decision of the Retailer 
Here, we analyze retailer subjects’ stock level decisions. Similar to our other analyses, 
we discarded the data of games where the retailer rejected the contract by setting zero 
stock quantity. Doing otherwise would cause issues with linear regression. 
We conducted regression analysis to regress the response variable, “the retailer’s stock 
level decision at period t”. The predictor variables and their abbreviations used in the 
regression are as the same as in Table 6.1.1, except the variable b, as we do not have 
buyback price as a contract parameter here. 
6.2.1.2 Experiment-Based Regression 
We tested the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between retailer’s stock 
quantity decision and the predictor variables in Experiment w1a on the average. p-
values less than 0.1 as a result of regression analysis means that we can reject the null 
hypothesis. Results are shown in Table 6.2.1.  
We observe that 29.4% of the variability in the stock quantity of a retailer can be 
explained by w(t), D(t-1), O(t-1), U(t-1) on the average. Despite the fact that such R2 
values are not enough for certainty, explaining almost 30% of the variability is also 
meaningful.  
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Table 6.2.1 Experiment-Based Multiple Linear Regression Results in Experiment w1a        
for the Retailer 
Response Predictor 
variables R
2 Adj. 
R2 p-value Equation 
yes w(t) and     
D(t-1) 0.068 0.060 0.000 
   Q(t) = 162.628 + 0.085*D(t-1) - 
0.378*w(t) 
yes w(t), D(t-1),   
O(t-1) 0.155 0.144 0.000 
        Q(t) = 124.977 + 0.274*D(t-1) 
- 0.36*w(t) + 0.502*O(t-1) 
yes w(t),  D(t-1), 
O(t-1), U(t-1) 0.294 0.281 0.000 
Q(t) = 103.335 + 0.546*D(t-1) - 
0.332*w(t) + 0.470*O(t-1) -   
0.483*U(t-1) 
yes D(t-1), O(t-1), 
U(t-1) 0.251 0.241 0.000 
Q(t) = 51.354 + 0.552*D(t-1) + 
0.483*O(t-1) - 0.496*U(t-1) 
no Ret. profit  (t-
1) and w(t)     
no Ret. profit(t-
1) and D(t-1)     
yes w(t) and          
D(t-1) 
          
0.068 
        
0.060 
     
0.000 
Q(t) = 162.628 + 0.085*D(t-1) - 
0.378*w(t) 
 
Next, in Table 6.2.2 we provide the results for the simple linear regression studies we 
conducted for each predictor variable separately.  
 
Table 6.2.2 Experiment-Based Simple Linear Regression Results in Experiment w1a  
for the Retailer 
Response Predictor 
variables R
2 Adj. 
R2 
p-value Equation 
yes wholesale price(t) 0.054 0.050 0.000 Q(t) = 172.856  - 0.37*w(t) 
yes demand(t-1) 0.012 0.070 0.100 Q(t) = 104.947 - 0.078*D(t-1) 
no Ret. profit(t-1) 
    
yes overage(t-1) 0.023 0.019 0.020 Q(t) = 111.899 + 0.184*O(t-1) 
yes underage(t-1) 0.038 0.034 0.030 Q(t) = 122.224 - 0.172*U(t-1) 
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Simple linear regression results in even lower adjusted-R2 values. We can not find any 
supportive ideas to explain the stock quantity decision. The predictor variable with the 
highest adj.-R2 is the wholesale price in the previous period with 5.4%. 
6.2.1.3 Subject-Based Regression 
Next, we analyze the stock quantity decision of the retailer in period t by subject-based 
regression. The results are provided in Table 6.2.3. 
 
Table 6.2.3 Subject-Based Multiple Linear Regression Results in Experiment w1a 
Sub. Predictor 
variables R
2 Adj. 
R2 p-value Equation 
Ret. 1 w(t), and     
D(t-1) 0.330 0.214 0.029 
Q(t)=184.644-
0.743*w(t)+0.315*D(t-1) 
Ret. 2 w(t), D(t-1), 
O(t-1) 0.799 0.795 0.002 
Q(t)=254.832-0.141*D(t-1)-
0.037*O(t-1)-0.872*w(t) 
Ret. 3 w(t), D(t-1), 
O(t-1) 0.632 0.598 0.031 
Q(t)=237.001-0.014*D(t-1)-
0.034*O(t-1)-0.898*w(t) 
Ret. 4 w(t), D(t-1), 
O(t-1)  0.822 0.819 0.000 
Q(t)=487.595+0.619*D(t-1)+ 
0.740*O(t-1)-2.795*w(t) 
Ret. 5 w(t), D(t-1), 
U(t-1) 
0.987 0.982 0.000 
Q(t)=252.690-0.009*D(t-1)-
0.903*w(t)-0.004*U(t) 
Ret. 6 
Retailer 
profit(t-1) and 
D(t-1) 
0.222 0.177 0.030 Q(t)=78.235+0.003*rp(t-1) 
+0.126*D(t-1) 
Ret. 7 w(t), D(t-1), 
O(t-1) 0.718 0.694 0.012 
Q(t)=247.170-0.090*D(t-1) 
+0.559*O(t-1)-1.384*w(t) 
Ret. 8 w(t), D(t-1), 
U(t-1) 0.827 0.816 0.000 
Q(t)=147.406+0.116*D(t-1)-
0.475*w(t)+ 0.171*U(t-1) 
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Similar to Experiment b1a, the results are subject-dependent. However, we observe that 
the the realized demand in the previous period, D(t-1), affects all retailers’ quantity 
decisions consistently.  In addition, wholesale price, demand, overage and underage 
values in period (t-1) are the other variables that explain the differences in the retailers’ 
stock quantity choices. The models in the subject-level regression are highly significant 
(i.e., the p-values are less than 0.1) for all retailers.  
6.2.1.4 Regression for the Wholesale Price Decision of the Manufacturer 
Here we focus on the manufacturers’ wholesale price decision. We control the 
relationship with multiple and simple regression analysis for each subject. The variables 
that we used for linear regression analysis of the manufacturers’ decision are the same 
as the ones shown in Table 6.1.5 except we do not have buyback price here. 
We also studied whether there is a significant relationship between each manufacturer’s 
(w) decision at a period with his decisions at previous periods. To this end, we 
conducted an autocorrelation analysis both for the wholesale price with three lags. This 
study is presented at Chapter 5, whereas the autocorrelation tables can be found in 
Appendix I.  
6.2.1.5 Experiment-Based Decisions 
When we conduct multiple linear regression to predict w(t), we cannot find  significant 
regression outcomes. Therefore, we cannot explain the variability in the wholesale price 
by multiple linear regression. The multiple predictor variables that we regressed can be 
seen in Table 6.2.4. 
 
Table 6.2.4 Experiment-Based Multiple Linear Regression Results in Experiment w1a   
for the Manufacturer’s Decision 
Response Predictor 
variables R
2 Adj. R2 p-value Equation 
no w(t-1) and D(t-1) 
    
no D(t-1) and Q(t-1) 
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If we use simple linear regression, we can only find significant outcomes with the 
manufacturer’s profit, where we are able to explain only 3.6% of the variability with 
very low beta coefficient as seen in Table 6.2.5.   
 
Table 6.2.5 Experiment-Based Simple Linear Regression Results in Experiment w1a  
for the Manufacturer’s Decision 
Response Predictor 
variables R
2 Adj. R2 p-value Equation 
no Q(t-1) 
    
no D(t-1) 
    
yes Manufacturer 
profit (t-1) 0.036 0.032 0.004 
w(t) = 142.825 +  0,01 * 
Manuf.profit(t-1) 
no Q(t-1) 
    
 
We conclude that linear regression does not help us to explain the wholesale price 
averages in Experiment w1a. 
6.2.1.6 Subject-Based Decisions 
Despite the fact that we could not find any significant predictor variables on the 
average, we can explain the variability of the wholesale price for four out of eight 
manufacturers as in Table 6.2.6. For the ones that we detect significant predictor 
variables, we observe that the wholesale price in the previous period always exists as 
one of the predictors.  
On the whole, linear regression is not considered as a strong tool for explaining the 
decision heuristics in Experiment w1a. 
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Table 6.2.6 Subject-Based Simple Linear Regression Results in Experiment w1a  for 
the Manufacturer’s Decision 
 
Subject Predictor 
variables R
2 Adj. R2 p-value Equation 
Mfg-1 
No response 
from the 
variables     
Mfg-2 
No response 
from the 
variables     
Mfg-3 w(t-1) and 
D(t-1) 0.794 0.778 0.000 
Q(t)=73.999+0.867*w(t-1)-
1.867*D(t-1) 
Mfg-4 w(t-1) and 
D(t-1) 0.260 0.203 0.020 
Q(t)=86.446+0.555*w(t-1)-
0.162*D(t-1) 
Mfg-5 w(t-1) and 
D(t-1) 0.651 0.624 0.000 
Q(t)=58.297+0.795w(t-1)-
0.425*D(t-1) 
Mfg-6 
No response 
from the 
variables     
Mfg-7 
Mfg. prof. 
(t-1) and 
w(t-1) 
0.195 0.165 0.017 
Q(t)=117.342+0.003*mp(t-1) 
+0.076*w(t-1) 
Mfg-8 
No response 
from the 
variables     
 
6.2.2  Orders Related to Wholesale Prices  
Parallel to Keser and Paleologo (2004), we try to support our regression analysis in the 
wholesale price contract by analyzing the retailers’ responses to wholesale price 
changes. For each of the retailers, we examine whether she reacted to an increase (or 
decrease) in w from  t-1 to t, with a decrease (or increase) in the stock quantity Q. 
Binomial test (significance 5%) shows that only one retailer out of eight reacted to an 
increase (or decrease) in w from t-1 to t, with a decrease (or increase) in Q. 
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6.2.3  Orders Related to Previous Waste  
In Experiment w1a, we found no retailers that behave as predicted by the availability 
hypothesis, where unsatisfied demand results in an increase in the stock quantity Q in 
the following period, and overstock results in a decrease in the stock quantity in the 
following period (Binomial test, p=0.05). In Experiment w1a, we found only one 
retailer to behave as predicted by the gambler’s fallacy hypothesis, which implies the 
opposite of availability hypothesis (Binomial test, p=0.05). 
6.2.4  Pull-to-Center Effect 
We conducted retailer and game-based analysis to see if pull-to-center effect exists in 
our Experiment w1a. Three out of eight retailers in this experiment acted according to 
pull-to-center effect in the majority of the periods (Ret-3: 27, Ret-4:15, Ret-5:28 out of 
30 periods).  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
We conducted experiments with human decision makers on a manufacturer-retailer 
supply chain where the retailer faces a newsvendor problem. Contrary to the theoretical 
predictions, we find the efficiency of the wholesale price contract and buyback contract 
to be close to each other. The buyback contract failed to improve supply chain profits, 
but only increased the manufacturer’s profit at the expense of the retailer’s profit. After 
Keser and Paleologo (2004), we are the first to conduct supply chain contracting 
experiments (involving newsvendor retailers) where both firms are represented by 
humans. We extend Keser and Paleologo (2004) to buyback contracts and we also study 
the effect of relationship length. 
 
In the buyback contract experiments, we observe the manufacturers to offer contracts 
that provide a reasonable expected profit to the retailer. This is quite different from their 
theoretically optimal buyback contract where the retailer is allowed to make only a 
negligible profit. The ultimatum structure (see Camerer 2003) of the relationship and 
“fairness” concerns of subjects (see Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) provides a possible 
explanation. The manufacturer may be concerned about the well being of the retailer, 
and may not find it “fair” to offer a contract with low expected profit level. 
Alternatively, the manufacturer may not care about fairness, but he thinks that the 
retailer cares about fairness. After all, the retailer has the vetoing power: She can reject 
a contract that she thinks is “unfair”, even when this is not the rational choice. The 
retailers did not resort to this weapon often in our experiments. However the fear of 
contract rejection is likely to have affected manufacturers’ contract parameter decisions.  
 
Bounded rationality of the manufacturers may also be effective. Making the necessary 
calculations with two contract parameters is not an easy task, despite the aid of the 
decision support tool. Hence, it is possible that the manufacturers simply could not 
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calculate their optimal contract parameters to begin with. Risk aversion of the 
manufacturer can also be a factor. The manufacturer may be unwilling to set a high 
buyback price because this would imply higher risk due to stochastic demand. By 
setting low wholesale and buyback prices, the manufacturers escaped from assuming 
sufficient inventory risk. Note that consistent with the literature, we considered take-it-
or-leave-it contracts. The results may definitely change if one allows the subjects to 
negotiate (see Haruvy, Katok and Pavlov 2011). This offers an interesting extension to 
our work.  
 
While buyback contract performed poorly, the wholesale price proved to be more 
efficient than the theoretical prediction. If fairness was a factor affecting our subjects, 
this observation is in line with the theoretical findings of Cui et al. (2007) who show 
that a simple wholesale price contract can coordinate the channel when the firms care 
about fairness.  The manufacturers offered lower wholesale prices than predicted, 
leading to higher stock quantities by retailers which benefited both the retailer and the 
manufacturer (slightly).  
 
For both contract types, we observe the retailers to overstock relative to the predicted 
newsvendor quantity. This is in line with Cachon and Schweitzer (2000)’s low/high 
pattern observation but contradicts Keser and Paleologo (2004). Because the theoretical 
prediction is for the newsvendor to “understock” relative to supply chain optimum, this 
overstocking bias actually helps improve supply chain profit. The retailer’s profit goes 
down a little, yet the manufacturer’s profit improves considerably. Hence, not all 
overstocking is detrimental.  
 
We expected to observe better performance in the long-run relationship experiments 
where the same manufacturer-retailer pair interacted for 30 periods, than in the short-
run relationship experiments. However, we observed just the opposite: Total profits are 
higher in the short run relationship games when the pairs are re-determined each period. 
Destructive “gaming” between the subjects in the long-run games may offer an 
explanation. This finding has implications for operations management practice, where 
long-run relationships between firms are favored over short-run ones.   
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Another widespread observation is the lack of significant learning (similar to 
Schweitzer and Cachon 2000). One expects the subjects to learn about the interaction, 
and improve profits over time. Learning is weak even in the long-run relationship 
experiments where the same pair interacted for 30 periods. As Schweitzer and Cachon 
comment, if learning is absent in our experimental setting, it is even less likely to be 
observed in practice where feedback (in terms of business success) is slower and more 
ambiguous. One can extend our work by focusing on the feedback and learning 
mechanisms. Our work can also be extended by conducting experiments with a higher 
number of periods. Although long experiments might result in demotivation of the 
subjects, a larger data pool might lead to more significant results in terms of learning. 
Human subjects’ decisions in experiments exhibit wide variation. Similar to other 
works in literature (see the discussions in Bolton and Katok 2008, and Becker-Peth, 
Katok and Thonemann 2009), a significant portion of our results are based on “average 
decisions”. While such results are helpful in outlining the “expected behavior”, one 
should not underestimate the variability around these expected values when predicting 
human behavior.  
In spite of all developments in information technology and information systems, it is 
still the human managers that make decisions in firms. As such, understanding the 
human biases related to supply chain contracts would be a rewarding endeavor.  
Experiments with humans allow firms and researchers to test contracts in a laboratory 
environment before making costly tests in the field. In addition, they can also be used as 
training tools.  
From research point of view, experiments with humans not only offer a way to test the 
predictive power of the analytical models but also point to the directions to improve 
these models.  By doing so, they introduce the “human dimension” into analytical 
modeling. Experiments are particularly helpful in the field of supply chain contracting 
because firms hardly ever share contractual information with outsiders. Our study 
identified a number of biases affecting the performance of wholesale price and buyback 
contracts in the presence of human-to-human interaction. Identifying such deviation 
from theory allows one to modify the contracts to account for, or to take advantage of 
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deviations. Future studies are needed to analyze these biases in detail and to incorporate 
them into analytical models.    
We used discrete uniform distribution in our experimental setting to replicate the setting 
of Keser and Paleologo (2004). Uniform distribution is popular in literature (Katok and 
Wu 2009, Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000, Bostian et al, 2008, Bolton and Katok, 2008). 
We believe the simplicity of uniform distribution might explain this popularity. It can 
be easily understood by the participants. However, one can also use other distributions 
in experiments.  
In our experiments, the parameters are set by the participants afresh in each game. 
Alternatively, one can study a setting where the subjects’ decisions cannot be changed 
for a number of periods (Bolton and Katok 2008 offers an example). For example, the 
manufacturer may be allowed to change the contract parameters every five periods, but 
not in between. Such a scenario may reflect business cases where contract parameters 
are not frequently changed.  
Our subject pool comprised undergraduate students at Sabancı University. Using 
students as experimental subjects is common practice in experimental economics and 
researchers have found no significant difference between students’ and professionals’ 
performance in experiments (see, for example Ball and Cech 1996, and Katok, Thomas 
and Davis 2008, and Bolton, Ockenfals, Thonemann 2008). Yet, the “external validity” 
of our results is always an issue, as it is with all experimental studies. To this end, we 
plan to repeat our study using Executive MBA students in the future.  
Standard method of motivation in experiments is monetary payment. We chose to 
motivate students differently, through a bonus grade. The bonus grade was highly 
prized by students, and as indicated in the exit surveys, provided strong motivation.  
This work merely scratches the surface of potential experiments on supply chain 
contracting. One immediate extension is the study of other contract types such as the 
revenue sharing, quantity discounts and rebate contracts. Another extension is to 
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conduct a deeper study on the decision heuristics of subjects, and on the factors 
affecting their decisions. In this thesis, we report the results of some work in this 
direction. This preliminary work; however, fails to find evidence for the use of decision 
heuristics. Finally, one can also develop detailed models regarding the learning process 
(using an Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA) learning model) and bounded 
rationality (using a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) model). 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix  A Main Script Code in Buyback Experiments 
// Define Player List 
 Players p1,p2,p3,p4,p5,p6,p7,p8,p9,p10,p11,p12,p13,p14,p15,p16; 
 Integer nplayer = 16;   //number of players 
// Declare variables 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\var-model.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\var-dummy.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\var-state.cfg"); 
// Set parameter value 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\dat-parameter.dat"); 
// Define inputs 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\def-input.cfg"); 
//Stage logon  
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-logon.cfg"); 
// Game stages 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-start.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-setgrid.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-predisplay.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-fetchdata.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-exchange.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-results.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-periodend.cfg"); 
Stage writedb {   // no db write statements in debug 
  Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-dblog-
period.cfg"); 
  if (stage=1) 
  { End;} 
  else 
  {Goto start;} 
}  
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Appendix  B The Script dat-parameter.dat in Buyback Contract 
Experiments 
stage setparameter  
{ 
 if (period=1 & stage=1) 
 {  // parameters start here 
  wholesalegiven = 0; 
  buybackgiven = 0; 
   
  price = 250;  
  unitcost = 50; 
  wholesale = 0; 
  buyback = 0; 
  mindemand = 40; 
  maxdemand = 230;              //parameters end here 
 
  // manufacturer's stage description 
  stagedesc[0,1] = "Wholesale and buyback price selection"; 
  stagedesc[0,2] = "Waiting for the retailer"; 
  stagedesc[0,3] = "Period results"; 
 
  // retailer's stage description 
  stagedesc[1,1] = "Waiting for manufacturer";  
  stagedesc[1,2] = "Stock quantity decision"; 
  stagedesc[1,3] = "Period results"; 
   
  numman = int(nplayer/2); 
  numret = nplayer - numman; 
 } 
  
 //allocation of fixed roles and variable partners   
 if (stage=1) 
 {    
 matched=0; 
 pos1=0; 
 pos2=0; 
              for (i=0; i<nplayer/2; i=i+1) 
  { 
   allocation1[i] = -1; 
  } 
  for (i=0; i<nplayer/2; i=i+1) 
  { 
   allocation2[i] = -1; 
  } 
  for (i=0; i<nplayer/2; i=i+1) 
  { 
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   pos1 = int(nplayer/2*random); 
   if (pos1 = nplayer/2) 
   { 
    pos1 = nplayer/2-1; 
   } 
    
   
   if (allocation1[pos1] = -1) 
   { 
    allocation1[pos1] = i; 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    while (allocation1[pos1] <> -1) 
    { 
     pos1 = (pos1 + 1) % (nplayer/2); 
    } 
    allocation1[pos1] = i; 
   } 
  } 
   
  for (i=0; i<nplayer/2; i=i+1) 
  { 
   pos2 = int(nplayer/2*random); 
   if (pos2 = nplayer/2) 
   { 
    pos2 = nplayer/2-1; 
   } 
    
   if (allocation2[pos2] = -1) 
   { 
    allocation2[pos2] = i+nplayer/2; 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    while (allocation2[pos2] <> -1) 
    { 
     pos2 = (pos2 + 1) % (nplayer/2); 
    } 
    allocation2[pos2] = i+nplayer/2; 
   } 
  } 
 
   
  for (i=0; i<nplayer/2; i=i+1) 
  { 
      
 match[allocation1[i]]=allocation2[i]; 
 match[allocation2[i]]=allocation1[i]; 
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 role[allocation1[i]] = 0;  //manufacturer 
 role[allocation2[i]] = 1;  //retailer 
    
 demand[allocation1[i]] = mindemand + int((maxdemand - 
mindemand)*random); 
 demand[allocation2[i]] = 0; 
  } 
   
 
  if (wholesalegiven = 1  &  buybackgiven = 1) 
  { 
   for (i=0; i<nplayer; i=i+1) 
   { 
    if (role[i] = 0) 
    { 
     wholesaleset[i] = wholesale; 
     buybackset[i] = buyback; 
    } 
    else 
    { 
     wholesaleset[i] = -1; 
     buybackset[i] = -1; 
    } 
   } 
  }  
 
  if (wholesalegiven = 1  &  buybackgiven = 1) 
  { 
   stage = 2;     // advance to stage 2 right away 
  } 
 } 
} 
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Appendix  C Instructions for Buyback Contract Experiments with Short-
Run Relationship 
Instructions for Buyback Contract Experiments 
March 23th, 2011 
Random Match 
 
Scenario 
 
We consider two independent firms: a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer produces a 
certain product. The retailer buys the product from the manufacturer by paying a wholesale 
price w per unit, and sells it to consumers at a retail price p=250. Consumer demand is 
distributed uniformly between 40 and 230. That is, demand is equally likely to be an integer 
value between 40 and 230. After the demand is realized, the manufacturer buys back the 
products that the retailer cannot sell by paying the retailer buyback price b per unit. 
 
       
       p      
 
The game has three stages: 
 
Stage-1:   The manufacturer determines the wholesale price, w and the buyback price, b. The 
wholesale price cannot be larger than the retail price p=250. The buyback price cannot be larger 
than the wholesale price. 
 
Stage-2:   Given the wholesale price and buyback price decisions of the manufacturer, the 
retailer determines his stock quantity, Q. The retailer orders this quantity of products from the 
manufacturer. The manufacturer produces the products by incurring a unit production cost 
c=50, and sends them to the retailer. The retailer stocks these products prior to the selling 
season. The retailer’s stock quantity can be either zero or lie between 40 and 230, the maximum 
consumer demand value.   
 
Stage-3:  Random consumer demand is realized as “d”. The retailer’s sales quantity is the 
minimum of his stock quantity and the realized demand: min	{, [}. Depending on whether the 
demand is greater or less than retailer’s stock quantity, two cases are possible: 
  Consumer Demand           Retailer Manufacturer 
w Q 
p=250 
c=50 
b 
127 
 
 
• If d>Q, then (d-Q) units of demand will be unsatisfied  (unsatisfied demand) 
• If d<Q, then (Q-d) products will be unsold at the retailer (leftover products). The 
manufacturer will buy back these units from the retailer.  
 
The retailer’s payoff is calculated as         ∗ min{, [} 		− 		 ∗ 		 + 			 ∗ [	– 		min{, [}]. 
The manufacturer’s payoff is calculated as      − 0 ∗ 		 − 		 ∗ [	– 		min{, [}].			  
Note that there are three decisions in the game: The manufacturer determines w and b, and then 
the retailer determines Q.  
 
Experiment Preparation 
 
• The experiments will take place at the CAFÉ (Center for Applied Finance Education) 
computer lab at the G-floor of the FMAN building. 
• Please come to the experiments on-time so that we can start and finish on time.  
• You will play a pilot experiment to solidify your understanding of the software. 
• Please do not open any other program, including other browser windows, during the 
experiments. 
• Please enter “integer values” for all decisions, and pay attention to the data entry rules. 
 
The Experiment 
 
• In the experiments, you will play the role of either a manufacturer or a retailer for a number 
of “periods”. Your role will be fixed in all periods of an experiment. In each period, the 
server will randomly match each manufacturer with a retailer. That is, you will be (most 
likely) playing with different opponents at each period. You will not know with whom you 
are matched.  
• The periods are independent of each other. For example, inventory is not carried from one 
period to the next. Only your payoff will accumulate over periods.  
 
A Sample Screenshot 
Figure 0.1 illustrates how the retailer’s screen will look like at stage 2.  
• The large table in the middle of the screen is your “decision support tool” (to be 
explained). 
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• The yellow box on the upper left presents general information including the period 
number, your current role, the wholesale price, and the buyback price that were set 
at stage 1. The box also presents two game parameters that are given and fixed 
throughout all periods (unit production cost, and retail price). 
• The blue box in the upper right presents information on the last period.  
• The pink box in the bottom is where you “submit” your decision to the server. You 
enter your decision value into the related gray box, hit “enter” and then click on the 
green “Submit” button at the bottom (that will be visible during experiment). The 
submit button is activated only after you enter a valid decision and hit enter (or, 
click somewhere in the screen).  Invalid entries will cause warnings. 
• Note that the cells in which you can enter values are the ones with “gray” 
background. 
• You can check the results of previous periods by clicking the “Historical Results” 
tab in the bottom. This will open a second worksheet with the titles seen in Figure 
0.2: 
 
Figure 0.1 Retailer’s Screen at Stage 2 
 
Figure 0.2 Historical Results Screenshot  
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The Decision Support Tool 
 
Before you submit a decision, you can use the "what-if" decision-support tool provided to you. 
This tool allows you to calculate the outcome for certain values of your decision, your 
opponent’s decision, and for specific realizations of the consumer demand. Note that the values 
you enter in this area are only for your temporary calculations. The only value that goes to the 
server (i.e., that is recorded) is the one you submit in the “stock quantity” box that you will find 
at the bottom of the screen.  
 
The retailer’s decision support tool can be seen in Figure 0.3. You may enter a “stock quantity” 
value in the top gray cell. To help you visualize the possible outcomes if you really set this 
stock quantity, the table in the decision support tool summarizes the outcome for different 
consumer demand realizations (d=40, 70, …, 230), each in a row.  
 
In the example above, the retailer’s stock quantity is entered as 200. We observe from the table 
that if consumer demand turns out to be, for example, 130, you (retailer) will sell 130 units 
because the demand is smaller than the stock quantity. You leftover inventory will be 200-
130=70 units. The manufacturer will buy back these units. Since you satisfied all consumer 
demand, there will be no unsatisfied consumer demand.  
 
Compare this with the outcome if consumer demand turns out to be 220. In this case, you (the 
retailer) will sell all of your 200 units, and there will be zero leftover inventory. Unsatisfied 
demand will be  220-200=20 units. As you sell your entire stock quantity, the manufacturer will 
not buy back any inventory. The last two columns provide your payoff and the manufacturer’s 
payoff. At stage 1, the manufacturer’s decision support tool will look like below: 
 
 
Figure 0.3 Manufacturer’s Decision Support Tool at Stage 1 
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At this stage, you (the manufacturer) will submit your wholesale price and buyback price. 
However, in order to use the decision support tool, you also need to guess what stock quantity 
the retailer might determine at stage 2.  
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Appendix  D Manufacturer’s Screen at Stage 1 
 
Figure 0.4 Manufacturer’s Screen at Stage 1 Screenshot 
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Appendix  E Retailer’s Screen at Stage 2 
 
 
Figure 0.5 Retailer’s Screen at Stage 2 Screenshot 
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Appendix  F Results Screen    
 
Manufacturer Screen 
 
Figure 0.6 Manufacturer’s Historical Result Sheet Screenshot 
 
 
Retailer Screen 
 
Figure 0.7 Manufacturer’s Historical Result Sheet Screenshot 
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Appendix  G Mean Differences Between the Experiments with Null Orders and without Null Orders  
Table 0.1 Mean Differences between the Experiments with Null Orders and without Null Orders in Buyback Contracts 
  
With Null Orders Without Null Orders 
  
w b Q Mfg. Prof. Ret. Prof. w b Q Mfg. Prof. Ret. Prof. 
 
Predicted 247 246 183 22,790 333 247 246 183 22,790 333 
Exp. #  of rej. Data Data Data Data Data Data Data Data Data Data 
b1a 3 181 81 127 13,797 5,229 180 82 129 14,066 5,350 
b1b 15 186 99 113 12,530 4,290 184 94 121 13,362 4,616 
b2a 2 163 50 124 12,568 6,668 163 51 125 12,667 6,736 
b2b 13 172 77 125 12,428 5,786 170 76 132 13,090 6,152 
 
Table 0.2 Mean Differences between the Experiments with Null Orders and without Null Orders in Wholesale Price Contracts 
  
With Null Orders Without Null Orders 
  
w Q Mfg. Prof. Ret. Prof. w Q Mfg. Prof. Ret. Prof. 
 
Predicted 176 96 12,126 5,011 176 96 12,126 5,011 
Exp. # of rej. Data Data Data Data Data Data Data Data 
w1a 5 155 115 11,813 6,423 154 118 12,076 6,554 
w1b 19 159 105 11,240 5,231 159 115 12,390 5,705 
w1c 13 150 116 11,234 6,301 149 123 11,935 6,707 
w2a 6 150 124 11,673 7,256 149 128 12,017 7,540 
w2b 0 146 139 13,120 7,003 146 139 13,120 7,003 
w2c 6 159 119 12,181 6,904 157 123 12,559 7,114 
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Appendix  H Autocorrelation Results for Experiment b1a 
Table 0.3 Autocorrelation Results for w(t) and b(t) for the First and the Last Ten 
Periods in Experiment b1a 
 
w(t) b(t) 
Periods 1-10 Periods 21-30 Periods 1-10 Periods 21-30 
Lag Autocor Sign. Autocor Sign. Autocor Sign. Autocor Sign. 
Mfg-1 
1 0.078 0.776 -0.044 0.872 0.475 0.083 -0.096 0.726 
2 -0.319 0.447 -0.118 0.889 -0.050 0.218 0.084 0.892 
3 -0.236 0.464 -0.138 0.905 -0.075 0.370 0.006 0.973 
Mfg-2 
1 0.692 0.011 -0.095 0.728 0.647 0.018 0.304 0.267 
2 0.334 0.018 -0.117 0.849 0.408 0.018 -0.007 0.539 
3 0.182 0.035 -0.139 0.883 0.065 0.043 -0.230 0.544 
Mfg-3 
1 0.100 0.715 0.407 0.137 0.693 0.011 -0.158 0.565 
2 -0.073 0.899 0.063 0.321 0.316 0.019 -0.026 0.843 
3 -0.109 0.937 -0.057 0.507 -0.058 0.047 -0.150 0.866 
Mfg-4 
1 -0.584 0.033 -0.699 0.012 0.076 0.782 -0.180 0.511 
2 0.318 0.048 0.171 0.034 -0.239 0.627 -0.348 0.324 
3 -0.483 0.018 0.152 0.067 -0.444 0.230 0.258 0.335 
Mfg-5 
1 0.536 0.050 0.683 0.013 -0.003 0.990 
Not able to 
autocorrelate 2 0.071 0.142 0.367 0.016 -0.007 1.000 
3 -0.447 0.062 0.050 0.040 -0.700 0.038 
Mfg-6 
1 0.017 0.950 -0.150 0.584 0.182 0.507 0.268 0.327 
2 -0.391 0.317 -0.175 0.684 -0.227 0.545 0.190 0.472 
3 -0.230 0.361 0.425 0.277 -0.445 0.202 0.310 0.369 
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Appendix  I Autocorrelation Results for Experiment w1a 
Table 0.4 Autocorrelation Results for w(t) for the First and the Last Ten Periods in 
Experiment w1a 
 
  w(t)   
Periods 1-10 Periods 21-30 
Lag Autocor Sign Autocor Sign 
Mfg-1 1 0.574 0.036 0.225 0.411 
  2 0.465 0.022 0.200 0.529 
  3 0.057 0.053 -0.350 0.337 
Mfg-2 1 -0.095 0.728 0.233 0.395 
  2 0.038 0.931 0.108 0.638 
  3 -0.205 0.834 0.024 0.823 
Mfg-3 1 -0.088 0.748 0.102 0.711 
  2 -0.473 0.177 -0.007 0.933 
  3 0.074 0.314 -0.008 0.987 
Mfg-4 1 0.330 0.228 Not able to autocorrelate 
  2 0.157 0.403 
  3 0.257 0.400 The values are same 
Mfg-5 1 0.163 0.551 0.654 0.017 
  2 -0.055 0.819 0.429 0.015 
  3 -0.298 0.588 0.155 0.031 
Mfg-6 1 0.670 0.014 0.522 0.057 
  2 0.109 0.046 -0.111 0.148 
  3 -0.205 0.076 -0.510 0.041 
Mfg-7 1 0.326 0.234 -0.241 0.378 
  2 0.378 0.169 -0.093 0.636 
  3 0.067 0.303 0.032 0.820 
Mfg-8 1 0.590 0.031 0.585 0.033 
  2 0.396 0.030 0.305 0.051 
  3 0.061 0.070 0.070 0.110 
 
 
 
 
 
